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Case Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Freedom of Speech-Dismissal of Public
School Teacher for Symbolic Expression of Political Opinion in the
Classroom Held Unconstitutional. James v. Board of Education, 461
F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
Charles James, a teacher of eleventh grade English, entered his class-
room with a black armband around his sleeve as a symbol of his opposi-
tion to the Vietnam war. After repeated disobedience of orders to
remove the armband, he was suspended.' Having appealed to the New
York State Commissioner of Education, James, a probationary teacher,
was granted an informal hearing before the Commissioner, who backed
the Board of Education in the dismissal decision. In federal district
court2 James asserted a violation of the Civil Rights Act,3 claiming that
the school authorities had infringed his first amendment freedom of
expression.4 The district court granted the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit unanimously reversed."
The circuit court dispensed with the appellees' res judicata argument
rather quickly. Appellees had argued that the matter was already decided
1. James received a letter from the Board of Education of the district grant-
ing him permission to return to class with the proviso that he "engage in no
political activities while in the school." He returned wearing his symbol of protest
and was again suspended and subsequently dismissed under N.Y. Educ. Law
§ 3013(1) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1972). In relating the facts of the case without
comment, the court of appeals noted the statement of the Commissioner of Educa-
tion that while no reason need be offered for the dismissal of a probationary
teacher, such dismissal must be "consistent with our basic Constitutional frame-
work." James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 570 n.7 (2d Cir. 1972).
2. The action was initiated by James in the District Court for the Western
District of New York against the Board of Education of Central District No. 1,
the District Principal, the school Principal, and the President of the School District
Board of Trustees. The decision was unreported.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: "Every person who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
4. The court disposed of the case without ever reaching the appellant's free-
dom of religion or equal protection claims. 461 F.2d at 571 n.12.
5. Id. at 576.
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by the Commissioner of Education of New York State, a "judicial
officer." The district court also concluded that James could not relitigate
the matter because he had failed to appeal to the New York courts.
Both reasons were found wanting. The circuit court ruled that appellant
had exhausted state administrative remedies as required and was not
required to exhaust state judicial procedures.7
The Supreme Court has firmly held that freedom of expression is not
an unqualified right:8
The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic
society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may
address a group at any public place and at any time.9
Furthermore, the early Supreme Court standard for permissible re-
striction of the freedom was weighted heavily in favor of the state. If
the legislature had reason to believe that some particular expression
would tend to conflict with a government objective, it could be pro-
hibited.'" Since this test afforded practically no protection to the indi-
vidual from government interference with his freedom of speech, it was
abandoned." Its replacement was the "clear and present danger" test
enunciated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States:'
2
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.' 3
6. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
841 (1970).
7. 461 F.2d at 570 citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Rodriguez
v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
8. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upheld state law
which as construed by state courts forbade utterance of fighting words in public);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (affirmed conviction for urging
obstruction of the draft in wartime).
9. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
10. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877 (1963) contains a history and
appraisal of first amendment tests [hereinafter cited as Emerson].
11. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951).
12. 249 U.S. at 52.
13. Accord, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378-79 (1927) (Brandeis and
Holmes, J., concurring), overruled per curiam, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 449 (1969) (overruling as to results but not as to "clear and present danger"
type first amendment test). In Schenck v. United States, the Court affirmed the
conviction of defendants who distributed literature to men called, for military ser-
[Vol. I
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In 1950, another approach was developed in American Communica-
tions Association v. Douds.14 In that case the Court upheld a provision
of the National Labor Relations Act which imposed restrictions on and
denied certain statutory benefits to labor unions whose officers refused
to file "non-communist" affidavits with the NLRB. 15 The statute was
enacted because of congressional findings that communists had infiltrated
union hierarchies and instigated obstructive strikes unrelated to union
interests. 8 Upholding the statute against first amendment attack the
Court described its decision-making approach as follows:
[It is] one of weighing the probable effects of the statute upon the free exercise
of the right of speech and assembly against the congressional determination that
political strikes are evils of conduct which cause substantial harm to interstate
commerce and that Communists ... pose continuing threats to that public interest
when in positions of union leadership.' 7
vice during World War I, inciting them to obstruct the draft, in violation of the
Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1970). The Court em-
phasized that the decision was restricted to such activities in wartime. 249 U.S.
at 52.
14. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
15. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 9, 49 Stat. 453, repealed, Act of Sept. 14,
1959, Pub. L. 86-257, tit. II, § 201(d), 73 Stat. 525.
16. 339 U.S. at 388-89; see Hearings before the House Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor on Bills to Amend and Repeal the National Labor Relations Act,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3611-15 (1947).
17. 339 U.S. at 400. The history of the first amendment tests related in the
text is not an unfailingly steady progression. For example, the Schenck case
establishing the "clear and present danger" test was-decided in 1919 prior to the
less rigorous test set out in Gitlow v. New York. However, the "clear and present
danger" test did become pre-eminent subsequent to the standard used in Gitlow.
"Clear and present danger" is not dead, though the balancing test now predom-
inates. A majority of the Court rejected the "clear and present danger" test in
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), but "[t]here is still some blood re-
maining in the doctrine, and it has continued to be used in certain types of situa-
tions." Emerson, supra note 10, at 912 (footnote omitted). See e.g., Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). Before 1950, during the period of the "clear and
present danger" test, some cases did not employ it. E.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937), Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Furthermore,
there are tests other than the major ones discussed in the text. For example the
gravity of the harm to be anticipated from the speech balanced against the likeli-
hood that it will occur, which is somewhere between the "clear and present danger"
test and the balancing test (Emerson, supra note 10, at 911); the view that freedom
of speech is absolute, meaning not that it may never be controlled, but rather that
the inquiry should be shifted to definitions of "abridge" and "freedom of speech"
rather than a full re-weighing of all governmental and social objectives and indi-
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Although very indefinite and offering few guidelines to courts in
deciding the extent of first amendment protections, the balancing testprobably does accord freedom of speech more weight than did the
previous tests.18 Under the "clear and present danger" standard, the
asserted governmental objective was not held up to judicial scrutiny so
much as was the alleged probability that the effects of the utterance in
question would clash with that objective. Under the balancing test, the
government's objective as well as the reasonableness of its apprehensions
regarding the effects of an individual's expression are subject to review
in court. 9
The question of which first amendment test the Court would apply
was at one time of little importance as far as public employees were
concerned-the Court had placed them in their public capacities outside
the protection of the first amendment. 20 Mr. Justice Holmes' dictum as
a state court judge that a citizen has a constitutional right to talk politics
vidual rights in each case. Emerson, supra note 10, at 914. This quite undefined
approach "has never commanded a majority of the Supreme Court" according to
Emerson. Emerson, supra note 10, at 915. The "absolute" test can be found in the
opinions of Mr. Justice Black dissenting in Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431,
438-46 (1961); Mr. Justice Douglas concurring in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 536-37 (1958); Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting in Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203, 262 (1961).
18. There are times, however, when the "clear and present danger" test might
seem to be more favorable to first amendment freedoms than the balancing test.
That might be true when the apprehensions of the legislature are justifiably grave,
the infringement of speech slight, and the danger that the evil consequences will
occur is not clearly imminent. In fact, the unions in Douds asked for the appli-
cation of the "clear and present danger" test. However, it might be suggested
that some of the school first amendment cases implicitly incorporate a "clear and
present danger" consideration into the balancing process with regard to potential
disruption of school discipline. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and its bearing on the principal case,
infra note 30 and accompanying text. See also note 17 supra.
19. Cf. Emerson, supra note 10, at 910-14. "It is not entirely clear whether
the test is meant to be one of general application to all first amendment issues
.. " Id. at 912.
20. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (holding that
the dismissal of a federal worker who violated the Hatch Political Activities Act
was constitutional); Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (upholding the
dismissal of a civil servant based on her allegedly doubtful loyalty). Both cases
are cited in Grossman, Public Employment and Free Speech: Can They Be Rec-
onciled?, 24 Admin. L. Rev. 109, 109-10 (1972) (reviewing history of constitu-
tional rights of public employees) [hereinafter cited as Grossman].
[Vol. I470
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but not to be a policeman, 21 captured the tenor of the early cases on the
constitutional rights of public employees. Since public employment was
considered by the Supreme Court to be a privilege and not a right, the
first amendment did not shield such an employee from dismissal for his
associations or words. 2 This, however, is no longer the law.'
Pickering v. Board of Education24 exemplified the change in the law
as applied to public school teachers. Pickering was dismissed as a high
school teacher in the Illinois school system because in a letter to a
newspaper he had criticized the raising and use of public funds by the
Board of Education. The Supreme Court upheld his first amendment
claim, ruling the dismissal unconstitutional. The Board's unsupported
allegation that the publication of the letter was by its nature a hazard to
the efficient operation of the system was deemed insufficient to justify
punishing participation of a teacher in public debate.25 The Court
described its approach to such cases succinctly:
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees. 26
It would seem then that public employees, including public school
teachers, are subject to the same free speech test as other individuals, but
21. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517
(1892).
22. See cases cited supra note 20.
23. Grossman, supra note 20 at 110-11. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350
U.S. 551 (1956) was one of the earlier cases to conclude that public school
teaching jobs were not privileges which could be revoked arbitrarily. The Court
reversed the New York Court of Appeals which had upheld a public college
professor's dismissal for refusing to answer questions before a congressional com-
mittee regarding his Communist Party membership several years in the past. The
Supreme Court, finding that New York already had the information from its
own hearings twelve years earlier and that there was no showing of any relation-
ship between the college duties of the professor and the questioned association,
declared: "This case rests squarely on the proposition that 'constitutional protec-
tion does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is
patently arbitrary or discriminatory.'" 350 U.S. at 556 (citation omitted).
24. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
25. See Van Alstyne, Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970
Duke L.J. 841, 848-54 for a full discussion of the case [hereinafter cited as Van
Alstyne].
26. 391 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added).
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that circumstances eculiar to their positions will be taken into con-
sideration.
It is just this balancing process that the Court uses in the principal
case to arrive at its conclusions.28 The same state objective of preventing
disruption of the smooth functioning of the school is again balanced
against the interest of free speech. While courts have recognized that the
educational process cannot be conducted with any effectiveness in the
midst of disorder, the precise manifestations of disorder that are neces-
sary to justify. limitations on first amendment rights of students and
teachers has been .a difficult question.29 In Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School District ° the Supreme Court held that.the
school administration's fear of disruption was not sufficiently founded to
warrant a ban on student armbands representing opposition to the Viet-
nam war. In his dissent, Justice Black noted that, according to the
record, the armbands provoked warnings by other students, counter-
warnings from students supporting the protesters, taunts, and the upset
of a mathematics lesson by disputes between a teacher and a protesting
pupil.8 1 Furthermore, the majority opinion quoted part of the record as
stating that there were in the school friends of a former student who died
in Vietnam, and that threats had been made by students opposing the
27. For example, the problems of indoctrination and disruption in the school
environment.
28.. The James court incorporates the quote into its opinion, 461 F.2d at 572.
In James, the court under the balancing test requires the school authorities to
carry the burden of showing adequate justification for their ruling. Id. at 574-76.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. at 507-
14 (1969) demands the same. But see Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Tinker, 393
U.S. at 526. He -suggests that to protect both free 'expression and the state's
right to. maintain school discipline, those attacking the rules should be required
to show that they serve other than legitimate school ends. For a collection of school
first amendment cases classified according to which party is required to carry the
burden of satisfying the balancing test, see Comment, 45 :N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1278,
1281-82 (1970).
29. Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding suspension
of student for failing to obey high school regulation forbidding the wearing of
any symbol unrelated to school affairs). In cases decided the same day, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a prohibition on the
wearing of "freedom buttons" by students in one school because of disruptions,
and enjoined a similar regulation in another school because of a failure to show
any resulting disorder. Compare Blackwell v. Board of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th
Cir. 1966) with Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
30. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
31. Id. at 517-18.
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symbolic protest to wear symbols of their own. 32 Nevertheless the Court,
in striking down the school directive, declared: -
[In our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.38
[T]he record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of" or material interference
with school activities . .. 4
If the school's fear of disruption was insufficiently founded in Tinker,
then it is utterly without objective support in James. In James the Board
of Education's apprehensions would seem to be based on the potentially
volatile nature of both the war controversy83 5 and political protest in
general, since no actual manifestations of tempers or disruption are
evinced by the record. 6 Appellees failed to make even a respectable
showing on the basis of the disruption test restated .by the James court:
Any limitation on the exercise of constitutional rights can be justified only by a
conclusion, based upon reasonable inferences flowing from concrete facts and not
abstractions, that the interests of discipline or sound education are materially and
substantially jeopardized, whether the danger stems initially from the conduct
of students or teachers.87
Clearly then, disruption of school discipline is not the basic issue in
32. Id. at 509 n.3.
33. Id. at 508.
34. Id. at 514.
35. 461 F.2d at 569 n.3.
36. Id. at 569.37. Id. at 571. But cf. Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970)
where a student was suspended for failing to obey a high school regulation
against wearing any symbol not related to school affairs. He had worn an anti-
Vietnam war button. The rule had always been. uniformly enforced. Originally
it was intended to halt the divisiveness of rival fraternities and later:to diminish
racial polarization in the racially mixed school. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit upheld the school's enforcement of the rule. The case is analyzed
in Comment, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev..1278 (1970). The author finds an inadequate
showing of the likelihood of disturbance under the standard of Tinker. Also,
though the court never clearly decided who had the burden of proof, the author
reasons that it was the plaintiff's burden to show that the school's reasons for the
regulation were not justified-a contrast with most of the school cases where the
court recognized that first amendment rights were. in the balance. Therefore,
the Guzick case also stands in contrast to the statement made in note 18 supra.
regarding the use of a "clear -and'present danger" consideration in .school first
amendment cases. In Guzick the "clear and present danger" test would have pro-
tected the student's rights better than the'balancing test did.: -
1973] 473
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James. Rather, the opinion is significant in what it says about the limita-
tions on school control of non-disruptive classroom expression.
The court in James acknowledges the validity of the appellees' argu-
ment that a teacher may by the strength of his position indoctrinate
students with his opinions:ss
inhere is merit to appellees' argument that Tinker does not control this case,
because a teacher may have a far more pervasive influence over a student than
would one student over another .... teachers cannot be allowed to patrol the
precincts of radical thought with the unrelenting goal of indoctrination .... 9
One possible solution presents itself-a classroom that is an entirely
neutral arena for the presentation of ideas and facts, completely free of
any advocacy by anyone.40 This concept was rejected in its application
to the students in Tinker who "wore [black armbands] to exhibit... their
advocacy of a truce, to make their views known, and, by their example,
to influence others to adopt them. 4'
James v. Board of Education rejects the neutral classroom as far as
the teacher's behavior is concerned, noting the allegation in Mr. James'
complaint that another teacher "without incurring any disciplinary
sanction, prominently displayed the slogan 'Peace with Honor' on a
bulletin board in his classroom," and recognizing the likelihood that
the school's real reason for censoring James was that it disliked his
views. 44 It would seem that a combination of positive and negative
factors motivated the court's decision: the first amendment rights of the
teacher and the danger that the "school authorities . . . might permit
38. See generally, Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81
Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1053 (1968); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 25, at 856.
39. 461 F.2d at 573.
40. See note 47 infra and accompanying text; cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 111 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Black suggested that
the legislative elimination of topics from discussion simply because of their con-
troversial nature might be constitutional. But cf. text accompanying note 54 infra.
41. 393 U.S. at 514.
42. "It would be foolhardy to shield our children from political debate and
issues until the eve of their first venture into the voting booth. Schools must play
a central role in preparing their students to think and analyze and to recognize
the demagogue." 461 F.2d at 574.
43. "Peace with honor" generally indicated opposition to immediate with-
drawal from the Vietnam war and support for continuation of the fighting until
a satisfactory conclusion was reached. Id. at 575.
44. "The Board's actions . . . would indicate that its regulation against po-
litical activity in the classroom may be no more than the fulcrum to censor only
that expression with which it disagrees." Id.
[Vol. I474
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prejudices of the community to prevail '45 if they had unrestricted discre-
tion to ban political expression.
Yet paradoxically, the James court approved in the abstract an in-
doctrinative function of the school to imbue pupils not just with educa-
tional basics, but also with the "basic values of the community."4 How-
ever, in view of the holding in the case and prior Supreme Court
opinions discussed below, any school indoctrinative function beyond
basic subjects should be considered very limited. In striking down a West
Virginia public school requirement that the flag be saluted, the Court in
Board of Education v. Barnette endorsed political neutrality in public
education.4 7 Furthermore, Meyer v. Nebraska,4" an early Supreme Court
foray into this area of state control of classroom expression, struck down
a statute intended not directly to impress children with specific local com-
munity values, but by indirect means to make them more receptive to the
pervasive values of the larger community of the nation. Meyer involved a
Nebraska criminal statute49 forbidding the teaching of modem foreign
language to children below the eighth grade. The reason for this post-
World War I law was to make sure that children of strongly ethnic
European homes learned the English language as their mother tongue
and became instilled with American ideals before any foreign language
or culture reached them. The Court found the conviction of a teacher
for instructing German to be an infringement of rights of expression and
thought, violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.50
45. Id.
46. Id. at 573. See Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81
Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1053-54 (1968). But cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 25, at
856-58.
47. "Free public education, if faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and
political neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party, or
faction." 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
48. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
49. Though the criminal nature of the statute involved in Meyer distinguishes
it from most of the other cases on teachers' first amendment rights cited in this
note, that fact is somewhat neutralized by an observation of the Supreme Court
in Keyishian v. Board of Regents: "Whether or not loss of public employment
constitutes 'punishment' [thus making it as unconstitutional as criminal punishment
of mere Communist Party membership] there can be no doubt that the repressive
impact of the threat of discharge will be no less direct or substantial." 385 U.S.
589, 607 n.11 (1967) (citation omitted).
50. 262 U.S. at 402. One commentator characterizes Meyer as follows: "The
case is interesting because it in effect acknowledges a constitutional right to teach
free from arbitrary restraints; the action having been brought by a schoolteacher.
1973]
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Forty-five years later the Court confronted a similar problem in Epperson
v. Arkansas5' and declared unconstitutional a statute which prohibited
the teaching of evolution in Arkansas schools. Dictum in the case is
cited by the court in James for the principle that states are entitled to
control the curriculum.52 But the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Stewart in Epperson sheds some light on what limited form school
indoctrination may take:
It is one thing for a State to determine that "the subject of higher mathematics,
or astronomy, or biology" shall or shall not be included in its public school cur-
riculum. It is quite another thing for a State to make it a criminal offense for a
public school teacher so much as to mention the very existence of an entire system
of respected human thought. That kind of criminal law, I think, would clearly
impinge upon the guarantees of free communication contained in the First
Amendment.53
Following Mr. Justice Stewart's logic54 and the import of the opinions
in Meyer and James, the state is on constitutionally safer ground in
seeking to imbue children with the value system it approves through
general curricular prescription rather than by proscription of the com-
munication of disfavored ideas.
The indoctrinative function of the school is further limited by the
growing recognition of a very special outgrowth of freedom of expression
-"academic freedom," which is a first amendment guarantee of "free
communication" applicable to the classroom. 55 "Free communication"
Furthermore, it illustrates how the prime rights: those of the children and
parents, can at times be vindicated before the Supreme Court in actions brought
by others." 1 C. Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law 91 (1969). Antieau finds
more in the case than a limit on legislative methods of imbuing children with
uniform values. His comment indicates that he finds suggestions of a constitutional
right to teach and to learn in the case.
51. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
52. 461 F.2d at 573.
53. 393 U.S. at 116. Mr. Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, based the
decision on the "establishment of religion" clause of the first amendment. How-
ever, the Arkansas State Chancery Court was affirmed in its result, and its reasons
were set out in the Supreme Court opinion with no indication of approval or dis-
approval. The state court had found a violation of the first amendment in that the
statute tended to "hinder the quest for knowledge, restrict the freedom to learn,
and restrain the freedom to teach." Id. at 100.
54. Mr. Justice Black expresses a similar view in his concurring opinion. Id.
at 111.
55. The term "free communication" was used by Mr. Justice Stewart in
Epperson. Id. at 116. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
[Vol. I
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is particularly apt because it suggests an exchange-concomitant rights
to express ideas and to receive them. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,6
the New York Feinberg Law5" requiring teachers to certify that they
were not communists or subversives within the meaning of the statute
was declared unconstitutional for "overbreadth." The fear of the Court
was that potential dismissal under such a law would chill the intellectual
enthusiasm of teachers and encourage them to avoid certain lawful as
well as unlawful expression and associations.5 A similar point can be
made in a James type situation. It is arguably difficult for a teacher to
conduct a. current events lesson that is at all sophisticated or stimulating,
with the discussion of alternative viewpoints, if he fears the intrusion of
punishable expressions of political opinion. The same might be said
of history and literature classes if the relevance of the subject matter to
the current world is to be considered a goal of education. Evidently the
Court does consider this to be an important goal. The Court wrote in
Keyishian:
The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection." 59
Sweezy v. New Hampshire° considered academic freedom to be so im-
portant and vulnerable that it sustained the first amendment right of a
teacher to withhold the content of his lectures from a state internal
security investigation. Writing for four Justices, Chief Justice Warren
declared:
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evalu-
ate, to gain new maturity and understanding .... 61
(1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). See also Van Alstyne, supra note 25, at 856-58.
56. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
57. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022 (McKinney 1970). N.Y. Educ. Law § 3021
(McKinney 1970) and N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 105(1), (3) (McKinney 1959)
were declared unconstitutional as implemented by § 3022.
58. 385 U.S. at 601, 604.
59. Id. at 603 (quoting from United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362,372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
60. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
61. Id. at 250 (emphasis added). The age of the pupils involved in any case
would seem to be a consideration in deciding whether academic freedom is being
abused. While most of the cases involve junior high school grades and above, the
age or maturity factor is often mentioned. E.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d
359, 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 356 (M.D.
19731 477
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James similarly recognized the policy consideration of exposing children
nearing voting age to political debate.62
The decision in a recent case is noteworthy for its treatment of the
persuasion of students-one of the variables in classroom situations
when teachers express their opinions. In Hanover v. Northrup' a teacher
of seventh and eighth grade was ordered reinstated to her job after
dismissal for remaining seated at her desk and refusing to lead her class
in the Pledge of Allegiance. Her actions were motivated by a belief
that the words "with liberty and justice for all" were an untrue statement
of present fact about the nation. The court found that Mrs. Hanover's
silent expression was protected by the first amendment against school
disciplinary action, saying "It does not matter whether some of her
students, who also refrained from recitation of the Pledge were per-
suaded to do so because of the plaintiff's conduct. 6 4 Taking James and
Hanover together it would seem that neither the spread of partisan
expression in classrooms,6 5 nor the effectiveness of the teacher's expres-
sion in converting students, is a consideration in finding a rational basis
for school restraints on the expression of political opinions in the class-
room.
Aside from situations where school discipline is disrupted, there are
two probable guidelines for the acknowledged "discretion of local school
authorities in setting classroom standards"'66 with regard to permissible
restraints on a teacher's speech. One was involved in the Goldwasser v.
Ala. 1970). In granting the relief sought by the dismissed teachers, both of
these opinions remarked that high school children are of sufficient maturity to
cope with the vulgarisms and sexual references in the literature Under discussion.
Cf. Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1965) (discussed in
note 68 infra).
62. 461 F.2d at 574 (quoted in note 42 supra).
63. 325 F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1970). Accord, Russo v. Central School
Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d. Cir. 1972) (dismissal of high school teacher for
refusing to recite the Pledge of Allegiance with her class held to be a violation
of the first amendment).
64. 325 F. Supp. at 173. The Court in Keyishian drew a distinction between
"one who merely advocates . . . doctrine in the abstract" and one who attempts
"to indoctrinate others ... ." 385 U.S. at 599.
65. James wearing his armband and another teacher writing his blackboard
slogan are likely to encourage an increase in this sort of activity.
66. 461 F.2d at 575; Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966);
Blackwell v. Board of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1966); N. Edwards,
The Courts and the Public Schools 592 (3d ed. 1971).
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Brown17 decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
That court upheld the discharge of a teacher hired by the Air Force to
instruct foreign military officers in English. He had repeatedly used
classroom hours to expound on his feelings about anti-Semitism in
America and the war in Vietnam. The denial of the teacher's first
amendment challenge was based on his failure to discharge the teaching
responsibilities for which he was hired, class time having been diverted
to his political and social commentaries. Therefore, when a teacher's
classroom expression has a distinctly adverse effect on the performance
of his proper function, school restrictions may be imposed.18 The second
instance in which restrictions are constitutionally permissible is the case
of a teacher's coercive proselytizing. This may be inferred from the
language used by the James court in emphasizing the inoffensiveness of
the teacher's conduct:
[T]he record is barren of a scintilla of evidence indicating ... that the armband
constituted more than a silent expression of James's own feelings .... 69
[W]e cannot countenance school authorities arbitrarily censoring a teacher's speech
'This is particularly so when that speech .... is not coercive .... 70
[C]learly there was no attempt by James to proselytize his students. 71
Therefore, an effort to pressure a class to adopt a partisan viewpoint,
rather than a submission of the opinion to group discussion and judg-
ment, might be subject to prohibition by school authorities. However,
as the Hanover court indicates, impermissible indoctrination of students
by a teacher may not be inferred from the mere fact that some of them
come to agree with his or her expressed opinion.
When the teacher does use the captive nature of his audience, an un-
67. 417 F.2d 1169, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
68. 461 F.2d at 574-75 & n.21. Cf. Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp.
222 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965)
(probationary public high school teacher's contract not renewed after his teaching
of the novel "Brave New World" provoked parental protest. The county board's
instructions to teachers had been to consider the maturity of students and com-
munity mores in assigning books. The board's action was upheld in part because
the first amendment does not protect indiscreet expression by the teacher amount-
ing to a kind of incompetence). See also note 72 infra, quoting from James.
69. 461 F.2d at 569.
70. Id. at 573.
71. Id. at 574.
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balanced presentation of information, or the threat of the sanctions
available to inculcate his political opinions in the minds of his students,
the courts might well permit the state or local governments, or their
agencies to control his classroom expression."2
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act
-Private Persons May Not Sue in Qui Tam Without Explicit Legisla-
tive Grant of Permission For Citizen Suits. Connecticut Action Now,
Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972).
Individual plaintiffs brought a qui tam action, alleging that defendant
was in violation of section 13 of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appro-
priations Act1 [Refuse Act] by reason of a discharge of waste materials
from its metal finishing plant into navigable waters without the required
72. Van Alstyne, supra note 25. See 461 F.2d at 576, wherein the court
stated: "[W]e disclaim any intent to condone partisan political activities in the
public schools which reasonably may be expected to interfere with the educational
process."
1. Section 13 is codified in 33 U.S.C. § 40 (1970) as follows: "It shall not be
lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be thrown,
discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating
craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill
of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever, other than
that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into
any navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of any navigable
water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water;
and it shall not be lawful to deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited
material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water, or on the
bank any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be
washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms
or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may .be impeded or ob-
structed: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall extend to, apply to, or
prohibit the operations in connection with the improvement of navigable waters
or construction of public works, considered necessary and proper by the United
States officers supervising such improvement or public work: And provided fur-
ther, That the Secretary of the Army, whenever in the judgment of the Chief
of Engineers anchorage and navigation will not be injured thereby, may permit
the deposit of any material above mentioned in navigable waters, within limits
to be defined and under conditions to be prescribed by him, provided application
is made to him prior to depositing such material; and whenever any permit is so
granted the conditions thereof shall be strictly complied with, and any violation
thereof shall be unlawful."
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permit. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin further discharge of such waste and
sought the informer's one-half interest in the monetary penalty prescribed
by the Act.2 The United States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut granted defendant's motion to dismiss;8 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,4 holding that private persons
cannot sue in qui tam, even though the Justice Department fails or
refuses to initiate proceedings in accordance with the Refuse Act, and
further holding that such persons are also barred from suing on behalf
of the public to enjoin violations of the Refuse Act.
Contemporary concern over the problems created by man's negligent
use of his environment has permeated almost every phase of human
activity. The apparent potential of the legal system as a means of pre-
venting pollution has resulted in the use of a plethora of legislative and
other legal devices to enforce compliance with anti-pollution laws.5 One
2. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970) codifies § 16 of the Act as follows: "Every person
and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall knowingly aid, abet, au-
thorize or instigate a violation of the provisions of sections 407, 408, and 409
of this title shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less than $500, or by imprisonment
(in the case of a natural person) for not less than thirty days nor more than one
year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, one-
half of said fine to be paid to the person or persons giving information which shall
lead to conviction."
3. Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 330 F. Supp. 695
(D. Conn. 1971).
4. Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.
1972).
5. Co-existing with the Refuse Act is the regulatory activity of the Water Pol-
lution Control Division of the Environmental Protection Agency, established un-
der Reorganization Plan No. 3, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970). In its comprehensive
program of quality control, the legislation, embodied in the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A., §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1973) is a compilation of
six major amendments. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, Act of Oct. 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816; the Water Quality
Act of 1970, Act of Apr. 3, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91; the Clean
Water Restoration Act of 1966, Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat.
1246; the Water Quality Act of 1965, Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234,
79 Stat. 903; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Act
of July 20, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204; the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1956, Act of July 9, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-660, 70
Stat. 498. For an analysis of all but the most recent provision, see Kramon, Towards
a New Federal Response To Water Pollution, 31 Fed. B.J. 139 (1972). The newest
and most comprehensive scheme of dealing with water pollution, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, will be discussed at notes 54-61 infra.
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such recent example has been the initiation of qui tam actions against
violators of anti-pollution statutes.
Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co. is distinguished
from prior environmental suits in that, for the first time, the court
proposes an exit from the legal cul-de-sac in which plaintiffs bringing
qui tam actions based on the Refuse Act have found themselves. The
opinion suggests that the solution lies in legislative action which will
facilitate proceedings such as attempted in the case at bar and others
which preceded it.7 The instant decision agrees with prior holdings that
the Refuse Act does not give plaintiffs the informants' right to sue, even
6. By definition: "An action brought by an informer, under a statute which
establishes a penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act, and pro-
vides that the same shall be recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty to
go to any person who will bring such action and the remainder to the state or
some other institution, is called a 'qui tam action' because the plaintiff states that
he sues as well for the state as for himself." Black's Law Dictionary 1414 (Rev.
4th ed. 1968). This definition has been recognized in a significant number of cases
dealing with the provisions of the Refuse Act. For a collection of cases see 457
F.2d at 84 n.4.
7. See, e.g., Lavagnino v. Porto-Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323
(D. Colo. 1971) (a complaint' under the Refuse Act must allege the effect of
the damage upon navigation, not upon the plaintiff's property); Bass Anglers
Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971)
(conservation organization, not having any special status, does not have standing
to bring private civil action against polluters for alleged violation of statutory
prohibition of refuse deposit in navigable waters); Enquist v. Quaker Oats Co.,
327 F. Supp. 347 (D. Neb. 1971) (plaintiff does not have a private right to sue
an alleged violator of the Refuse Act); United States ex rel. Mattson v. North-
west Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971) (statute prescribing a penalty
for the wrongful deposit of refuse and providing for payment of moiety to the
informant can be enforced only by government prosecution); Durning v. I.T.T.
Rayonier, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. Wash. 1970) (33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970)
intended to reward the informant, not to provide a means of recovery from the
violator); Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp.
412 (N.D., M.D., S.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971) (a stat-
ute allowing an informant to share in any fine imposed upon conviction of a
violator does not imply any private right of enforcement but rather creates crim-
inal liability which can be enforced only by the government); Bass Anglers Sports-
man's Soc'y v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302
(S.D. Tex. 1971) (no express or implied statutory authority for private parties
to bring the qui tam action); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848
(E.D. Wisc. 1971) (statute prohibiting the deposit of refuse in navigable waters
and prescribing a penalty thereto enforced only by government prosecution, not
by private qui tam action). See also Comment, The Refuse Act of 1899: Its Scope
and Role in Control of Water Pollution, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1444 (1970).
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in situations when the Justice Department fails or refuses to initiate
proceedings in accordance with the Act."
A determination of the rights and liabilities created by the Refuse Act
can be made by considering a group of actions brought by the Bass
Angler Sportsman's Society.9 In Bass Angler Sportsman's Society v.
United States Steel Corp.,10 plaintiff sought the imposition of fines
against the corporate defendant and also named the government as a
defendant for aiding such violations by refusing to biing criminal pro-
ceedings against the corporation."' The federal district court held that
the Refuse Act does not imply the existence of a private right of enforce-
ment against parties depositing refuse in navigable waters.'2 The statute
creates only criminal liability, and its provisions can be enforced only
by governmental authorities.'"
8. See, e.g., Lavagnino v. Porto-Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323, 325
(D. Colo. 1971).
9. Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp.
339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel
Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D., M.D., S.D. Ala. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's
Soc'y v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.
Tex. 1971).
10. 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D., M.D., S.D. Ala. 1971).
11. It was alleged that the government's failure to prosecute amounted to aid-
ing and abetting the violator, thus constituting a violation of the Act. Id. at 414.
For the text of § 16, see note 2 supra.
12. 324 F. Supp. at 415-16: "The court concludes that no authority exists for
the plaintiff to maintain this action to recover fines provided by sections 407 and
411. These sections create a criminal liability. No civil action lies to enforce it;
criminal statutes can only be enforced by the government. A qui tam action lies
only when expressly or impliedly authorized by statute to enforce a penalty by civil
action, not a criminal fine. The express mandate of section 413 in placing enforce-
ment of sections 407 and 411 in the Department of Justice prevents any interpre-
tation creating a private right of action to recover the specified fines."
13. Another recent case based on the Refuse Act, United States ex rel. Matt-
son v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971), likewise holds
that the statute can be enforced only by government prosecution, not by private
qui tam action. The court held that the language of the statute reveals no intent
to confer on an individual citizen the right to initiate proceedings qui tam when
the government fails to act: "[I1t must have been that Congress contemplated in
1899 that the initiative to prosecute violators should reside exclusively in the
government, and that the informer's right would arise only after successful prose-
cution, assessment of a fine (or imprisonment in the court's discretion) and if a
fine were imposed, an award of one-half of such to the informer. Until that point
the informer's interest in the fine, the right upon which he here predicates stand-
ing to sue, is only hypothetical." Id. at 91.
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The most helpful authority for the plaintiffs is perhaps found in Mr.
Justice Black's dictum in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess4 wherein
he recognizes an implied authorization for individual action: "Statutes
providing for a reward to informers which do not specifically either
authorize or forbid the informer to institute the action are construed to
authorize him to sue.""' This statement has frequently been criticized
as too broad,"6 although many courts, including the court in Connecticut
Action, have considered it in reaching their decisions.' 7
The court's decision in Connecticut Action turned on the interpreta
tion of the language of the Refuse Act in accordance with the legislative
intent of Congress. Since there is no common law right to maintain a
qui tam action,' 8 a comprehensive examination of the statute is neces-
sary to determine if such a right has been created.. The court in Con-
necticut Action pointed out that previous rulings which upheld a private
right to sue found that the statute in question "expressly stated or clearly
implied that the informer could begin the proceeding without waiting
for governmental action."'". However, .in enacting the Refuse Act, Con-
gress imposed a criminal penalty to be sought by the United States
Attorney General. Congress neither stated nor suggested that the in-
former could proceed independently against the violator prior to the
successful completion of a criminal prosecution by federal authorities.2"
The discretion of the Attorney General in his decision whether or not
to initiate or abandon any given prosecution is considered absolute.2'
14. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
15. Id. at 541 n.4 (citation omitted).
16. In particular, the Bass Angler cases have affirmatively stated that the qui
tam action depends entirely on statutory authorization and that such action has
never found its way into the common law.
17. 457 F.2d at 84-85. The Refuse Act, like all statutes, embodies the ideals
and aspirations of its creators which must be acknowledged and possibly 're-
evaluated at each encounter. Application of this particular statute forces exam-
ination of one of the basic tenets of American governmental process, to wit,
governmental exercise of discretion. In the Connecticut Action case this point
is raised by the question of the injunction. Other cases sharpen the challenge' by
actually naming the government as co-defendant for failure to prosecute.
18. See notes 15-16 supra.
19.' 457 F.2d at 84.
20. Id. at 84-85. For the legislative history of the Act, see U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News, Mar. 3, 1899. Recently, however, the Water Pollution Control Act
has been amended to provide for citizen suits. See text accompanying notes 54-61
infra.
21. 457 F.2d at 35. See also United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.
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The decision to prosecute has far-reaching effects. Its ramifications may,
for example, include increased cooperation between state and federal
government units resulting from a federal decision to leave prosecution
to the state involved.2" A 1970 decision 2s8 concluded that the motivating
purpose in the enactment of the Refuse Act was to reward those whose
assistance as informers led to the conviction of violators; it was not to
sanction individual civil actions against the violators to recover the fine
which might have been imposed had the government elected to initiate
criminal proceedings.24 Necessarily, a court could not be forced to
establish a priority between criminal prosecution by the United States
Attorney and a civil suit under the same statutory provision by an in-
formant.25
In addition to suing for the statutory penalty, plaintiffs in Connecticut
Action also sought injunctive relief against further waste deposit in the
Naugatuck and Housatonic Rivers by the defendant corporation. The
Refuse Act empowers the Attorney General to sue for the statutory
penalty and to seek injunctions against violators of the Act.26 But the
existence of this governmental power to obtain such an injunction does
not mean that private citizens may do S0 .27 The court reasoned that
plaintiffs in Connecticut Action are merely members *of the general
public despite their claim to be "surrogates for the public over and above
1965): "Although as a member of the bar, the attorney for the United States is an
officer of the court, he is nevertheless an executive official of the Government, and
it is as an officer of the executive department that he exercises a discretion as to
whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a particular case. It follows, as an
incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to inter-
fere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the
United States in their control over criminal prosecutions." Id. at 171.
22. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. .1967).
23. Durning v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
24. Id. "This Court concludes that Congress in enacting this criminal statute
intended to reward an informant for information leading to the conviction of the
wrongdoer and not to provide a means by which an informant may proceed to
recover against the violator of the criminal statute the amount he might otherwise
receive from a fine which 'might' be imposed after conviction of the defendant
in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 447.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967);
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); United States v.
Florida Power & Light Co., 311 F. Supp. 1391 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
27. Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp.
412 (N.D., M.D., S.D. Ala. 1971).
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the normal and official representative of the public interest. ' 28 Conse-
quently, they are not entitled to injunctive relief.2 9
The plaintiffs in Connecticut Action relied on several cases80 involving
other statutes in attempting to establish their right to sue, but the court
pointed out that none of the cases involved a provision like section 413
of the Refuse Act, and that all of the decisions challenged administrative
action by federal officers.81 Although such challenge is implicit in
Connecticut Action,8 2 the thrust of the argument differs. The cases relied
on by the plaintiffs sought judicial scrutiny of action undertaken by the
government. They were not, as in Connecticut Action, instances wherein
a citizen brought suit on behalf of the public against an individual who
had harmed him no more than the general public. A citizen who has
been specifically injured by improper refuse deposit may have other legal
means of redress, although the Connecticut Action court preferred not
to comment on this possibility. Moreover, plaintiffs herein were able
to show no such injury.
It is well established then that an action in qui tam against an alleged
violator of the Refuse Act will not lie so long as the existing law remains
unchanged. 4 Regardless of the form of relief sought by plaintiffs in qui
tam actions prior to Connecticut Action-whether it was a share in the
fine, the granting of an injunction, or the establishment of standards85
for the issuing of permits in accord with the Act 8 -such attempts have
28. 457 F.2d at 90.
29. Id. at 81. The determination that conservation groups are not elevated to
a position above the general public is not without authority. See, e.g., Bass Anglers
Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. 1971)
wherein the court held that conservation groups have no special status with respect
to the exclusive power to enforce federal statutes traditionally vested in the Justice
Department. Hence, as the Connecticut Action court determined, they enjoy only
the rights of individual citizens.
30. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
Association of Data Processing Service Organ. v. Camp. 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
31. 457 F.2d at 89.
32. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
33. E.g., riparian landowners may have common law remedies. 457 F.2d
at 89.
34. The court stated that any change which is made should be the product
of the legislature, not the judiciary. Id. at 90.
35. E.g., Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F.
-Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). See note 1 supra for text of statute.
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failed. The plaintiffs' right to sue has been denied by reason of the
specific statute in question and the general rule that a private person has
no right to enforce a penal statute.3 7 Additionally, the decision of the
Justice Department not to initiate criminal proceedings is not subject
to judicial review. 8
Plaintiffs in Connecticut Action argued that the mode of recovery of
the fines prescribed for violation of the Refuse Act is not specifically
outlined; 9 the court pointed out however, that the fine referred to in
section 411 of the Refuse Act is not a civil but a criminal fine to be im-
posed in a criminal proceeding.4
In announcing its decision to follow the preceding cases in point, the
court suggested that, because of the restrictions inherent in the Refuse
Act, any change which is made should be the product of legislative
enactment rather than judicial decision. 41 The court refers to one such
recently enacted statute, The Clean Air Act of 1970,42 whereby an
individual citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf
against violators of emission standards and limitations, or against admin-
istrators for failure to perform in accordance with the statute. 8
37. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); Smith v. United
States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967); Lavagnino v. Porto-Mix Concrete, Inc.,
330 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1971).
38. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970) outline the
specifics of judicial review. Section 701 states: "This chapter applies, according to
the provisions thereof, except to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial
review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2461(a) (1970) provides: "Whenever a civil fine, penalty or
pecuniary forfeiture is prescribed for the violation of an Act of Congress without
specifying the mode of recovery or enforcement thereof, it may be recovered in
a civil action."
40. 457 F.2d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1972). The court cites United States v. Claflin,
97 U.S. 546 (1878) to the effect that "if the statute by which the penalty was im-
posed contemplated recovery only in a criminal proceeding, a civil remedy could
not be adopted." 457 F.2d at 86.
41. Id. at90.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
43. Id. The section provides: "(a) Establishment of right to bring suit. Ex-
cept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may commence a
civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emis-
sion standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
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The solution to the problem posed by Connecticut Action lies -in the
enactment of new legislation, either expressly authorizing the qui tam
action, or permitting the private right to sue for legal and equitable
relief. In the case of qui tam, the grant must be specific, since the qui tam
action by definition has no existence apart from explicit statutory pro-
vision.44 The right arises not from the statutory right to a share in the
imposed penalty, but rather from an express or implied statutory grant
of authority to maintain the action.45 Moreover, the penalty must be a
civil, not criminal, fine since the proceeding is civil in nature.46
An important consideration in the creation of such legislation and in
the administration of citizen suits pursuant to this legislative grant in-
volves consideration of justiciability, 47 that is to say, whether the con-
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Admin-
istrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary
with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in con-
troversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emission standard or
limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act
or duty, as the case may be."
44. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See also
note 6 supra.
45. Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp.
412, 415 (N.D., M.D., S.D. Ala. 1971). Such interpretation of the Refuse Act is
consistent with decisions involving other similar statutes which impose penalties and
provide for payment of a moiety to an informer. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Union Iron
Works, 109 F. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1901). But cf. Williams v. Wells Fargo & Co.
Express, 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910) (no qui tam permitted where statutory
provision incorporated by reference into federal procedure statute prohibiting
quitam action).
46. 324 F. Supp. at 416. The qui tam action has long been a part of the
American legal system. See, e.g., Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336
(1805). Since the right to maintain a qui tam action does not exist outside the
limits of statutory provision, the language of those statutes invoked as originative
of the right to maintain a specific qui tam action must necessarily be subject to
thorough interpretive investigation. The language of the Refuse Act itself has
repeatedly been determined to preclude any qui tam action. The informer is en-
titled to part of the fine only upon conviction. The court in Bass Anglers Sports-
man's Soc'y v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302
(S.D. Tex. 1971) pointed out that the informer's rights are dependent upon a
criminal proceeding, a conviction, and a fine. This same conclusion is pointedly
set forth in the Connecticut Action case. 457 F.2d at 86. But cf. notes 37-38
supra.
47. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) for an analysis of the
requisites for justiciability.
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troversy is properly before the court and asserted by one who has a
sufficient interest in the claim. Clearly, legislation authorizing a citizen
suit for violation of federal environmental standards must be structured
in accordance with the mandates set out by the Supreme Court in
Sierra Club v. Morton wherein the Court held that a person has stand-
ing to institute a civil suit49 only if he can show that he himself has
suffered or will suffer injury, whether economic or otherwise. The Court
pointed out that: "[P]alpable economic injuries have long been recog-
nized as sufficient to lay the basis for standing, with or without a specific
statutory provision for judicial review."5 The Court stressed that there
must be more than injury in fact; the party instituting the suit must have
sustained injury.5' The principle that the Sierra Club asked the Court
to establish would have authorized a party to institute suit merely to
vindicate its own value preference. 2 So stated, the petitioners' position
clearly fell outside the purview of the Court.5 3 Sierra makes the common
law principle that one cannot secure an injunction unless his injury is
greater than that of the general public applicable to environmental
citizen suits. This mandate can be readily effected by a provision in the
statute clearly stipulating standards relating to injury.
In October, 1972, Congress, declaring as a national objective the
48. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
49. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970). Section 10 of the Act [5 U.S.C. § 702]
provides that a person who suffers legal wrong or is adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute may seek ju-
dicial review.
50. 405 U.S. at 733-34.
51. Id. at 735.
52. Id. at 740.
53. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Sierra, suggests a way of avoiding
this dead end by giving the inanimate object in question the standing to sue: "The
critical question of 'standing' would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if
we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated
-before federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about
to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded . ..where injury is the subject of public
outrage. Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological equilib-
rium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue
for their own preservation." 405 U.S. at 741-42. Mr. Justice Douglas points to
inanimate objects which are sometimes parties in litigation, e.g., ships, which have
a legal personality, a useful fiction in maritime law. Mr. Justice Blackmun also' dis-
sented on the ground that Sierra is not an ordinary case; preservation of the en-
vironment is a problem of such consequence that rigid law and inflexible pro-
cedural concepts must be reevaluated. Id. at 755-56.
1973]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
restoration and maintenance of the chemical, physical and biological
integrity of the nation's waters, enacted what may prove the most per-
vasive and comprehensive scheme to date to stem water pollution-The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.11 In amend-
ing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,5 Congress established
comprehensive programs for water pollution control under the direction
of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.56 The Act
provides a five step approach in preventing, reducing, and improving
the sanitary condition of surface and underground waters-research and
related programs (Title I), development and implementation of waste
treatment management plans and treatment works (Title II), standards
and enforcement (Title III), certification of facilities through permits
and licenses (Title IV), and administrative procedure and judicial
review (Title V).
Title V of the Act provides for civil suits,"7 to include a qui tam action,
by any citizen on his own behalf. Section 505(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence
a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an ef-
fluent standard or limitation under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Ad-
ministrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Admin-
istrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with
the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard
or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such
act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under
section 309(d) of this Act.58
Subsection (b) establishes that a citizen must give notice of intent to
maintain suit sixty days prior to the institution of such suit against a
"6person," as defined in (a), and further provides that no action may be
commenced if the Administrator or State has commenced a civil or
54. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1973). For a legislative history of the
Act, see U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News, 92d Sess. 3668 (1972).
55. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1973).
56. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(d) (Supp. 1973).
57. Id. § 1365. Subsection (a) provides the right, qualified only by the proce-
dural requisites of (b).
58. Id. § 1365(a). Cf. note 43 supra.
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criminal proceeding against the violator." The section further provides
that a court may award costs of litigation to include counsel and expert
witness fees and grant temporary injunctive relief. 0° Furthermore, nothing
in the section restricts any right which the aggrieved party may have
under statute or common law to seek enforcement or relief, including
any qui tam penalty provided for by either state or federal statute. 1
This most recent federal enactment would appear to meet the re-
quisites posed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Connecticut Action, in that a private right to sue is both
preserved and permitted by statute. More importantly, the fact that the
recent amendment expressly provides for a private right to sue the
polluter directly or to sue the government for failure to comply with
duties prescribed by the Act may well obviate the need for qui tam
actions in environmental suits. Given the application of Sierra Club
standing principles, the citizen may now pursue a course of action directly
and on his own behalf, rather than bringing suit in a representative
capacity, or relying on the discretion of administrative agencies for
assistance. While the statute has received early criticism for "effectively
repealing the Refuse Act of 1899 as it applies to ongoing industrial dis-
charges,' ' 2 its multi-phased approach and guaranty of citizen suits
alleviates much of the morass of environmental litigation.
59. Id. § 1365(b). It provides: "No action may be commenced-(1) under
subsection (a) (1) of this section-(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has
given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in
which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard,
limitation, or order, or (B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a
State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such
action in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of
right. (2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to sixty days after the
plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator, except that such
action may be brought immediately after such notification in the case of an action
under this section respecting a violation of sections 306 and 307(a) of this Act.
Notice under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator
shall prescribe by regulation."
60. Id. § 1365(d).
61. Id. § 1365(e).
62. 168 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1972). U.S. Attorney Whitney North Seymour, Jr.,
in a speech before Natural Resources Defense Council, while generally com-
mending the comprehensive nature of the national abatement program, com-
plained that the new amendments involve complex administrative procedures
which shelter industrial polluters from the reach of U.S. Attorneys, in that "a
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The number of judicial decisions suggesting the strong need for a
legislative rather than judicial response to the problems of the environ-
ment point to the fact that a responsible legislative delegation of
authority may indeed make significant inroads in dealing with environ-
mental protection suits. In particular, while the authority for enforcing
environmental standards is vested in federal regulatory agencies,63 little
progress will be achieved if the shield of official governmental discretion
in prosecuting violators remains the ultimate standard. Legislation
authorizing citizen suits will not only provide an effective vehicle to in-
sure adherence to environmental standards, but may well initiate the
beginning of a participatory concept whereby citizen involvement would
supplement the efforts of administrative enforcement in attempting to
stem what has proved a complex and unrestrained societal concern.
LANDLORD-TENANT LAW-Summary Proceedings to Oust-
Tenant Has No Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial When Counter-
claiming for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability. Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 294 A.2d 490 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
On July 20, 1971 the landlord filed a complaint under section 16-
1501 of the District of Columbia Code' seeking possession of real
property due to the tenant's failure to pay three months' rent in the
amount of $375. No claim for rent in arrears was made. In his answer
the tenant claimed a setoff in the sum of $389.60 for repairs the tenant
made and counterclaimed for $75 for the landlord's alleged violation of
local housing regulations in regard to the leased property. The court, in
a non-jury trial, entered judgment granting possession to the landlord.
On appeal, the tenant maintained that a summary proceeding is in
the nature of the common law action of ejectment, that his counterclaim
polluter can now be hauled into court only when the Administrator ... completes
his administrative proceedings. . . ." Id.
63. See note 5 supra.
1. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-1501 (Supp. V 1972) states: "When a person de-
tains possession of real property without right, or after his right to possession
has ceased, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, on complaint under
oath verified by the person aggrieved by the detention, or by his agent or attorney
having knowledge of the facts, may issue a summons to the party complained of
to appear and show cause why judgment should not be given against him for the
restitution of possession."
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for a breach of the implied warranty of habitability was also an action
at law and that under the seventh amendment2 he was entitled to a jury
trial.' The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that no constitu-
tional right to a jury trial could be invoked.4
The seventh amendment5 limits the right to jury trial to "[s]uits at
common law."' A basic problem is to determine whether the amendment
refers to the common law of England as it existed in 1791 or the
2. U.S. Const. amend. VII provides: "In Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
3. More than a theoretical constitutional question, the resolution of who the
trier of fact will be-a lay jury or a professional judge-may very well determine
the outcome of the suit. A lay jury is likely to be composed of at least some
tenants and is therefore less anxious to enforce many of the archaic property
laws which in many instances are clearly unfair to tenants. Thus it follows that
if the tenant is able to present his case to a jury his chances of success will be
improved. This by no means runs contrary to our system of justice. In fact "one
of the purposes of the jury system is to permit the jury to temper strict rules of
law by the demands and necessities of substantial justice." Edelman, A Trial
Brief on Behalf of the American Jury System, 3 Trial Lawyers Quarterly 26, 33
(1965-66).
4. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 294 A.2d 490 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
5. The seventh amendment applies to the federal courts (Pearson v. Yewdall,
95 U.S. 294 (1877)), United States territories (Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22
(1§88)) and to the District of Columbia (Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174
U.S. 1 (1898)). The amendment has not been applied directly to the states.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon,
262 U.S. 226 (1923); Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211
(1916); Williams v. Williams, 13 N.C. App. 468, 186 S.E.2d 210 (1972). State
courts, in construing their own constitutional provisions for jury trials in civil
cases, have often found federal construction of the seventh amendment persuasive
if not controlling. See, e.g., Dudley v. Harrison, McCready & Co., 127 Fla. 687,
173 So. 820, rehearing denied, 128 Fla. 338, 174 So. 729 (1937) (persuasive);
Fedoryszyn v. Weiss, 62 Misc. 2d 889, 310 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (con-
trolling). The right to a jury trial referred to in many state constitutions is held
to refer to the right as it existed in the territory when the Consitution was adopted.
Kuhl v. Pierce County, 44 Neb. 584, 62 N.W. 1066 (1895); State v. Greenwood,
63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957). If the state, before obtaining statehood, had
been a United States territory, it was, as noted above, governed by the United
States Constitution. At least one state has reached the conclusion that unless
amended, the state constitution is in essence preserving the seventh amendment
right. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co. v. District Court, 455 P.2d 690 (Okla.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 25 (1969).
6. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
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common law of the states as of that date. Since jury practices in the states
were diversified at the time the amendment was passed,7 to interpret the
amendment as referring to the common law of the states would require
each district court to apply a different standard, depending on the state
law involved. This would result in a federal constitutional right having
a different meaning from state to state. Also, if the amendment referred
to the common law of the states as it stood in 1791, it would be difficult
to determine the extent of the right in states admitted to the Union after
1791.8 Thus, the settled law is that the common law to which the amend-
ment refers is the common law of England as it existed in 1791.1
The amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in all suits to settle
legal rights which are not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction. 10 Thus, for
the tenant in Pernell to be entitled to a jury trial, he would have to show
that a summary proceeding is in essence an action at law.
In Pernell, the tenant contended that a summary proceeding brought
under section 16-1501 is in the nature of an action in ejectment, which
was triable by jury at common law." Therefore, the issue is whether
the action is to be treated as an ejectment proceeding requiring a jury
trial or as another type of proceeding which would permit a non-jury
trial.
An action in ejectment has been defined as:
[A]n action to recover possession of real estate, in which the plaintiff's title may
or may not become an issue; that it is not automatically in issue, and is not in
issue at all unless the defendant challenges it.12
While there is authority that the issue of title is always present in an
action in ejectment," this is probably because title usually does become
7. Partly because each colony originated at a different stage of the English
historical development, the law varied in style and emphasis in each. Henderson,
The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 289, 299 (1966).
For example, some states readily used procedural devices for controlling a jury
while others subjected the jury to little or no control. The possibility of a special
verdict or procedure for securing a new trial differed from state to state. Id. at
310-17.
8. Id. at 336.
9. Baltimore & C. Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935); Capital Trac-
tion Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1898); Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.
1961).
10. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
11. 294 A.2d at 492.
12. Shapiro v. Christopher, 195 F.2d 785, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
13. McArthur v. Porter, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 205, 211-12 (1832).
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an issue. 14 In essence, ejectment is an action to recover possession of real
property. 15
At common law, ejectment was not the only method by which a land-
lord could regain possession of leased premises. The landlord had a
right to re-enter immediately and take possession of the rented premises
upon expiration of the lease.'6 He could regain possession by use of force
without being liable in tort provided he used "no more force than
necessary,"' 7 and used a degree of force short of that which threatened
death or caused serious bodily harm.'8 This common law right to obtain
possession by force has been replaced in many jurisdictions by statutes
of forcible entry and detainer which provide for a summary proceeding
to oust.'9
One purpose of the summary proceeding is to obviate resort to self-
help and prevent possible resulting breaches of the peace. 20 It provides
an expeditious remedy for a landlord, who may be deprived of income to
meet expenses due to a tenant who dishonestly and wrongfully holds
over.
21
In view of this historical background, the court in Pernell appears
to be following the weight of authority by holding that a summary
proceeding is not in essence an action in ejectment and therefore the
right to trial by jury does not attach.22 Although the issue raised and
14. Shapiro v. Christopher, 195 F.2d 785, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
15. Staffan v. Zeust, 10 App. D.C. 260 (Ct. App. 1897).
16. "It would seem that at common law the landlord had the right, after
the expiration of the tenant's term, to immediately re-enter and take possession
of the rented premises, and that in so doing a resort to force was legal, provided
no more force was used than was actually necessary to eject the tenant." Entel-
man v. Hagood, 95 Ga. 390, 391, 22 S.E. 545 (1895); see also Smith v. Reeder,
21 Ore. 541, 28 P. 890 (1892).
17. The Supreme Court of Oregon found: "[Bly the decided weight of au-
thority, he may enter and expel the tenant by force, without being liable to an
action of tort for damages, either for his entry upon the premises, or for an
assault in expelling the tenant, provided he uses no more force than is necessary
and does no wanton damage." Smith v. Reeder, 21 Ore. 541, 546, 28 P. 890, 891
(1892); Entelman v. Hagood, 95 Ga. 390, 22 S.E. 545 (1895).
18. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71 (1972).
19. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 82.01-.101 (Supp. 1973); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 648.1 (1950); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.105-.160 (1971).
20. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71 (1972); Shorter v. Shelton, 183 Va.
819, 33 S.E.2d 643 (1945).
21. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1972); Frazee v. Bratton, 26
S.C. 348, 2 S.E. 125, 127 (1887).
22. Cameron v. United States, 148 U.S. 301 (1893); Brown v. Slater, 23
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remedy sought are often the same-the right to possession of real
property-the historical origins of the two remedies differ and as a
result, under the seventh amendment, the right to a jury trial attaches to
one but not the other.
The tenant in Pernell further contended that he was entitled to a jury
trial under the seventh amendment due to the historical background of
section 16-1501. In Urciolo v. Evans23 the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia, in a factual situation similar to the instant case, traced the
development of section 16-1501 from the writs of entry and assize which
existed at common law and found that the tenant had a right to a jury
trial. The Pernell court accepted the historical background set forth in
Urciolo, but did not recognize the jury functions traced in Urciolo as
those protected by the seventh amendment. 24 In reaching this conclusion
the Pernell court relied on Capital Traction Co. v. Hof.25 In that case
the United States Supreme Court held that a jury trial in a civil action
before a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia was not a jury
trial within the meaning of the seventh amendment. Since cases of
forcible entry or detainer had been brought in justice of the peace courts
in the District of Columbia,26 Pernell reasoned that the jury functions
which the Urciolo court traced were not seventh amendment jury trials.27
As a defense to the landlord's action, the tenant asserted a setoff of
$389.60 for repairs he made on the premises and a counterclaim of $75
for the landlord's failure to comply with housing regulations. Arguing
that this is a legal defense based on breach of the implied warranty of
habitability, the tenant claimed a right to a jury trial on his counter-
claim. 28
A few jurisdictions across the country, including the District of
Columbia,29 are beginning to imply a warranty of habitability in leases.80
App. D.C. 51 (Ct. App. 1904) (dictum); Reece v. Montano, 48 N.M. 1, 144 P.2d
461 (1943).'
23. 99 Daily Wash. L.R. 1729 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1971).
24. 294 A.2d at 495.
25. 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
26. Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 243, § 2, 13 Stat. 383.
27. 294 A.2d at 495.
28. Id. at 497.
29. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
30. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Reste
Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). As the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin reasoned, "[t]o follow the old rule of no implied warranty
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Often the standard of habitability used is that of the local housing
statutes.8' In those cases where the existence of the warranty is recog-
nized, contract principles are applied to the lease. 2 The tenant's covenant
to pay rent is held to be dependent on the landlord's honoring the war-
ranty of habitability. 3 In jurisdictions where the warranty is recognized,
when a landlord brings a summary proceeding to oust the tenant for
failure to pay rent, the tenant is allowed to assert in defense the land-
lord's breach of the warranty of habitability.84
At common law, the right to a jury trial attached to an action for
breach of contract.", Since the District of Columbia treats a lease as a
contract, 6 a claim that a covenant in the lease has been breached would
normally be considered an action in contract and hence a right to a jury
trial would arise. However, the court in Pernell held that since there was
no implied warranty of habitability at English common law in 1791, the
warranty does not fall within the meaning of "common law" in the
seventh amendment, and no right to a jury trial existed for the action . 7
This interpretation would restrict the seventh amendment right to jury
trial to those breach of contract causes of action which existed at com-
mon law in 1791. This is contrary to the generally recognized interpre-
tation that the amendment preserves the right in all suits to settle legal
rights as distinguished from those in equity or admiralty."8 In Ross v.
of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current
legislative policy concerning housing standards. The need and social desirability
of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid population increases is too
important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche, caveat emptor." Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961).
31. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251
A.2d 268 (1969).
32. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.); cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
33. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring,
Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
34. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
35. Snell v. Niagara Paper Mills, 193 N.Y. 433, 436-37, 86 N.E. 460, 461
(1908).
36.. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
37. 294 A.2d at-497.
38. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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Bernhard9 the Supreme Court, quoting from Parsons v. Bedford,4 held
that the seventh amendment applies to:
[n]ot merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled
proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and deter-
mined, in contradistinction to those where . . . equitable remedies were admin-
istered. 41
The court in Parsons went on to say:
Probably, there were few, if any, states in the Union, in which some new legal
remedies, differing from the old common-law forms, were not in use; but in
which, however, the trial by jury intervened, and the general regulations in other
respects were according to the course of the common law. Proceedings in cases
of partition, and of foreign and domestic attachment, might be cited as examples
variously adopted and modified. 42
Under this view, if the lease is regarded as a contract, the landlord's
breach of warranty gives the tenant an action in breach of contract
which involves a legal right and hence a right to a jury trial."
Even if a lease is not regarded as a contract, at common law a tenant
had a cause of action to recover damages suffered by the landlord's
breach of an express covenant to repair." Since the implied warranty of
habitability places an obligation on landlords to make repairs, a breach
of this obligation presents a legal claim.
Ordinarily, when a complaint sets forth an equitable claim, a de-
fendant has a right to a jury trial on any legal counterclaim he may
assert.45 Thus, if breach of the implied warranty of habitability is a legal
claim within the meaning of the seventh amendment, the tenant should
have a jury trial on that issue.
To justify the court's result in this case an analogy could be drawn to
bankruptcy proceedings which are inherently equitable proceedings to
which the right to jury trial does not attach. 6 The Supreme Court, in
39. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
40. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
41. 396 U.S. at 533, quoting 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 447 (emphasis supplied by
Ross Court).
42. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 447.
43. Snell v. Niagara Paper Mills, 193 N.Y. 433, 86 N.E. 460 (1908).
44. Hargis v. Sample, 306 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1957).
45. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord
Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961).
46. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234,240 (1934).
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Katchen v. Landy,47 held that when a creditor asserts a legal claim in the
summary proceedings, he is not entitled to a jury trial. This holding does
not violate the seventh amendment, the Katchen Court reasoned, since
the creditor could have brought his counterclaim in a separate action in
which he would be entitled to a jury trial. s By filing his legal claim in
the bankruptcy proceeding, the creditor has impliedly consented to the
adjudication by the bankruptcy court in a summary proceeding. Since
equity courts have power to grant complete relief, they may do so even if
they must afford what would otherwise be legal relief.49
The Katchen Court distinguished Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover5"
and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,51 which held that defendants have a
right to jury trial on legal counterclaims though the complaint sounded
in equity. The latter two cases did not involve a specific statutory scheme
contemplating the quick resolution of a claim without the intervention
of a jury trial, as was the case in the Katchen bankruptcy situation. 2
The Katchen Court noted that both Beacon and Dairy Queen recognized
there were situations where an equitable claim would be resolved first,
though the result might dispose of issues involved in the legal claim. 58
The Court felt that to implement congressional intent, a bankruptcy
court may summarily adjudicate a legal counterclaim voluntarily sub-
mitted.54
Similarly, in view of the legislative purpose to adjudicate summarily
the claim for possession 5 in the statute of forcible entry and detainer and
because the tenant voluntarily raised the legal issue as a defense rather
than bringing a separate action on it,5" he may be regarded as having
waived the right to a jury trial on the legal claim. This view is strength-
ened by the fact that Rule 5(b) of the Landlord and Tenant Branch of
the Superior Court characterizes tenants' defenses of recoupment, setoff
or counterclaim based on credits against the rent as equitable.57 The
47. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
48. Id. at 336.
49. Id. at 338.
50. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
51. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
52. 382 U.S. at 339.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 339-40.
55. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72 (1972).
56. Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 261 A.2d 413 (1970).
57. D.C. Super. Ct. (Landlord and Tenant Branch) R. 5(b): "In actions in
this branch for recovery of possession of property in which the basis of recovery is
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court,'in Pernell, noted that the defendant's right to assert defenses rested
on the rule of the court and not upon the Constitution and therefore
he could only assert equitable rights in accordance with the rule."8
Generally, despite limitations on the tenant's defenses in summary
proceedings, the tenant is not precluded from bringing another action in
ejectment or trespass and suing for damages if he were ousted in the
summary proceeding." In this second action he would be entitled to a
jury trial. 0° A summary proceeding would therefore not deprive him of
the right to a jury trial on the breach of implied warranty of habitability.
However, once having exercised his option by bringing the counterclaim,
the court's determination is res judicata to the claim and the tenant
thereafter may not bring a separate action on the claim.61
By tracing the roots of the summary proceeding in a forcible entry
and detainer statute to the common law right of the landlord to re-enter
the premises using reasonable force rather than to an action in ejectment,
the court concluded that the seventh amendment does not guarantee a
right to jury trial in the summary proceeding. The court's holding that
the tenant was not entitled to a jury trial on his counterclaim rests on the
argument that breach of warranty does not fall within the amendment's
protection, because it did not exist at common law in 1791. This reason-
ing is erroneous since it makes the amendment applicable only to those
causes of action which existed at common law rather than those involv-
ing legal rights as opposed to those in equity or admiralty. However,
even though the breach of the implied warranty of habitability should be
protected by the seventh amendment, the court's result is justified under
a theory of waiver similar to that utilized in bankruptcy proceedings. It
may be argued that the theory of warranty of habitability is based upon
nonpayment of rent or in which there is joined a claim for recovery of rent in
arrears, the defendant may assert an equitable defense of recoupment or set-off or
a counterclaim for a money judgment based on the payment of rent or on expendi-
tures claimed as credits against rent or for equitable relief related to the premises.
No other counterclaims, whether based on personal injury or otherwise, may be
filed in this branch. This exclusion shall be without prejudice to the prosecution of
such claims in other branches of the court."
58. 294 A.2d at 498.
59. Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 261 A.2d 413
(1970); Van Vlaanderen Mach. Co. v. Fox, 95 N.J.L. 40, 111 A. 687 (Sup. Ct.
1920).
60. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
61. Geracy, Inc. v. Hoover, 133 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Antonelli v,
Smith, 113 A.2d 570 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955).
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the present and immediate right of use as an affirmative defense against
summary proceedings. However, if a jury trial were permitted on any
legal counterclaim which a tenant might assert, the proceeding would
no longer be summary and conceivably, by operation of the forcible
entry and detainer statute in conjunction with the seventh amendment,
the landlord would be deprived of a remedy which he previously had
and of which neither the amendment nor the statute intended to deprive
him.
WELFARE LAW-Retroactivity of Benefits-Federal Court-Ordered
State Retroactive Payments of Federally-Supported Public Assistance
Funds (AABD and AFDC) Precluded by Economic Realities of Welfare
Program Goals and Eleventh Amendment. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467
F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972).
Plaintiffs commenced this class action1 in federal district court to
challenge section 131-a 2 of the New York Social Services Law which
provided for welfare payments' to New York City recipients at a level
higher than that set for residents of seven other New York counties4
1. Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Litigation was
initiated on behalf of all welfare recipients in a seven county area in the categories
of Aid to Aged, Aid to Blind, and Aid to Disabled, [hereinafter collectively
cited as AABD]. Id. at 340. A preliminary injunction was issued and four
months later, in October 1969, intervention was sought on behalf of other welfare
recipients (in the same geographic area) who had been beneficiaries of that
category of aid known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children [hereinafter
cited as AFDC], which intervention was permitted by the district court. Enforce-
ment of the statute was thus stayed with respect to recipients in both aid-categories.
2. Law of March 30, 1969, ch. 184, § 5, [1969] N.Y. Laws 217 [hereinafter
cited as N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 131-a], as currently amended, N.Y. Soc.
Services Law § 131-a (McKinney Supp. 1972).
3. This payment, referred to as the "Flat-Grant Pre-added" allowance, in-
cluded food, clothing, personal incidentals, household supplies, school expenses,
utilities and sales taxes. It did not include rent which was computed separately.
New York City, N.Y. Dep't Soc. Services Info. No. 69-45 (Sept. 26, 1969).
4. The counties were Nassau and Suffolk comprising the non-New York City
regions of Long Island; Westchester which borders New York City immediately
to the north; Dutchess and Ulster which abut one another astride the Hudson
River some 50 miles to the north of New York City, but which are not contiguous
with Westchester County; Greene County which lies southwest of Albany; and
Monroe County, which consists of Rochester and its surrounding environs on the-
southern shore of Lake Ontario, some 300 miles to the northwest of New York
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upon a determination by the state welfare administrator that adequate
cause existed for the differential in payment levels.5 Plaintiffs, residents
of these non-New York City counties, were recipients of the various
kinds of public welfare assistance for which partial federal reimburse-
ment is provided to the states for funds that they have expended.'
City. These vast geographic separations give rise to a lamentable example of
judicial reiteration of prior error. In 1968, the New York State Department of
Social Services divided the state into three regions and standardized aid levels for
the counties it included within each region. The five metropolitan New York City
counties were at that time included in the same region as the aforementioned
seven. The three-judge district court chose to characterize these seven as
the "surrounding counties." 303 F. Supp. at 342. The court purports to con-
duct a lengthy analysis of the state legislature's possible reasons for fixing New
York City welfare payment levels at a higher rate than those set for a rural north
Catskill Mountain area such as Greene County. Id. at 344-49. This court's
examination finds no justification for such payment differentials, yet this remark-
able analysis is content throughout to reiterate a profound unawareness of even
the most basic elements of the state's physical geography, referring time and again
to the regions involved as New York City and its surrounding "suburban com-
munities." Id. More distressing is the fact that such an error survives to influence
subsequent proceedings. Thus, in the initial remand, Judge Motley, in ordering
the retroactive payments, repeats the error. Rothstein v. Wyman, 336 F. Supp.
328, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court of appeals in the instant case even goes
so far as to identify the seven counties as "neighboring" in finding the cost
differentials unjustified. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 229 (2d Cir. 1972). It
cannot, of course, be stated with certainty that a fuller appreciation of geographic
realities or a more accurate understanding of such terms as "urban," "rural," and
"adjoining" as they apply to the New York counties would have guaranteed a
different result in the cases at hand. It is regrettable, though, in view of different
courts' stated attempts to consider the pragmatic realities of the complex issues at
bar that such an egregious error was permitted to influence even one decision,
let alone several.
5. On June 5, 1969, the Commissioner of Social Services, exercising the
power granted him in the amendment to § 131-a, raised the monthly levels of
assistance in the seven county area from $60 to $65 for single recipients, and
from $183 to $191 for a family of four. This compared with New York City
levels of $70 and $208, respectively. 303 F. Supp. at 342-44.
6. The "various kinds" of public assistance for which federal reimbursement
may be provided to the states are set forth in the Social Security Act of 1935: 42
U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (1970) (Old Age Assistance) [hereinafter cited as OAA]; 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970) (AFDC); 42 U.S.C. 99 1201-06 (1970) (Aid to the
Blind) [hereinafter cited as AB]; and 42 U.S.C. 99 1351-55 (1970) (Aid for the
Permanently and Totally Disabled) [hereinafter cited as APTD]. A state may elect
the option of combining three of these four programs-OAA, AB, and APTD-
into one composite program of aid to the aged, blind, and disabled under 42
U.S.C. 99 1381-85 (1970) (AABD).
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Asserting that section 131-a conflicted with the Social Security Act7
and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, plaintiffs
sought to have the statute declared invalid and to enjoin its enforcement.
A three-judge court found that likelihood of success on the constitutional
claim warranted the issuance of a preliminary injunction staying enforce-
ment of section 131-a.8 The court gave only minimal consideration to
plaintiffs' alternative statutory claim premised upon the Social Security
ActY On appeal, 10 the United States Supreme Court reversed, citing its
decision in Rosado v. Wyman," and remanded for an opportunity to
pass on the merits of the statutory claim.' 2
The original three-judge district court, finding that the differential set
forth in section 131-a constituted invidious discrimination in violation of
the equal protection clause, had decided that the proper form of relief
was to enjoin further enforcement and, upon remand to a single-judge
court, this choice of remedy remained essentially unaltered.13 In sub-
mitting to the single-judge court an order which embodied this prospec-
tive injunctive relief, plaintiffs, for the first time, sought to require defen-
dants to make retroactive payment of those monies which the state had,
7. In particular, the complaint alleged that § 131-a conflicted with 42 U.S.C.
§§ 602,. 1382 (1970) and with regulations issued thereunder. See, e.g., 45
C.F.R. § 233.20 (1972).
8. 303 F. Supp. at 351.
9. Id. at 350.
10. Wyman v. Rothstein, 398 U.S. 275 (1970).
11. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 402 (1970), wherein the Court held
that a federal court passing on the validity of a state's welfare program should
dispose of any pendent statutory claims before reaching the constitutional issues
that are presented.
12. 398 U.S. at 275. In essence, the Court ruled that the district court should
consider the "propriety of granting interim relief in accordance with conventional
equitable principles on the basis of appellees' statutory claims, or, if the question is
reached, continuing the present injunction in light of this Court's decision in
Dandridge v. Williams.. . ." Id. at 276-77. In Dandridge, the Court, upholding a
Maryland maximum grant regulation (which imposed an upper limit on the total
amount of money any one AFDC family unit could receive) against a challenge
that it violated the Social Security Act and the equal protection clause, reaffirmed
the principle that in the area of economics and social welfare, a state has great
latitude in dispensing its available funds. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970).
13. 303 F. Supp. at 347, vacated and remanded, 398 U.S. 275 (1970). On
remand from the Supreme Court, the rationale for the lower court's holding was
adjusted as had been instructed but the relief granted remained the same. Rothstein
v. Wyman, 336 F. Supp. 328, 333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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in the plaintiffs' view, improperly withheld from the seven county area
recipients. 14 Defendants proposed a counter-order omitting any provision
for retroactive payments; but nearly a year later, the district court
entered an order and judgment in accord with the relief suggested by
plaintiffs. 15 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed this judgment. It found that the statutory scheme creating the
welfare programs in question embodied a cooperative approach between
federal and state governments 6 and concluded that the district court had
improperly exercised its equity jurisdiction in awarding the retroactive
payments. 17 Finally the court found that, "in any event, federal jurisdic-
tion to grant such relief is foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment."'
The court in deciding Rothstein found two separate bases for denying
the retroactive payments, each basis in itself sufficient to mandate the
reversal of the "remedial provisions of that decree."'" These bases were
that (1) the goals of public assistance programs were in no way aided
by compelling retroactive payments and that (2) the federal courts,
regardless of the efficacy of such payments, could not, consistently with
the Supreme Court's traditional view of the purport of the eleventh
amendment,2 ° constitutionally require those payments to be made.
14. Specifically, plaintiffs petitioned that defendants be required "(1) to
recompute, by reference to the New York City levels, the payments to all recipients
in the seven-County area between July 1, 1969, and October 1, 1969 (AABD)
and November 1, 1969 (AFDC), and to remit the differentials; and (2) to give
notice to all persons who during the periods in question had applied for assistance
and had been denied it for lack of eligibility under the lower schedules of § 131-a
that they would now be held eligible upon application within 60 days and en-
titled to receive payments under the higher schedules from the date of their
originally unsuccessful applications." 467 F.2d at 231.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 228.
17. Id. at 235-36.
18. Id. at 228-29.
19. Id. at 228.
20. U.S. Const. amend. XI. The eleventh amendment was adopted to eliminate
an apparent breach in the protection from private suit afforded by the ancient
doctrine of sovereign immunity which breach resulted from ratification of art.
III, § 2 of the Constitution itself. See note 71 infra. This section appeared to
establish federal courts as a forum wherein citizens of one state could sue another
state without that state's consent. The eleventh amendment terminated the develop-
ment of case law on this point. See C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal
Courts 183 (2d ed. 1970). This amendment was then judicially extended to
preclude suits by a citizen against his own state. Id. Such extension may not
really have been necessary since it is possible that the original art. III, § 2 could
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The first of these bases exemplified a sense of pragmatism. The court
examined the essential nature of the federal-state relationship char-
acterized by the Supreme Court as a "scheme of cooperative federal-
ism."'21 Note was made of the peculiar "strains"22 felt by the "poorer
partners"23-the states-in the federal system.
The states were, of course, not obligated to participate in the federal
programs, but the incentives-matching grants-to do so were great,
designed to encourage the states to "make generous use of their own
funds to aid their impoverished citizens. '24 Historically, these incentives
were provided by the Social Security Act which established in 1935 four
categories of public assistance.25 The federal government thus undertook
to contribute a substantial percentage of a particular state's total aid
expenditure for those needy persons meeting the requisite categorical
requirements. Though federal monies were the major component of the
funding totals, the administration of these programs was left to the
states to be conducted through their local social service departments.
The systems of allocation were to be designed by the respective state
legislatures.26 Since the states have traditionally been free "to pay as
little or as much as they choose" 27 in welfare benefits, participation by a
state in the federal program was not required. 2s However, those states
wishing to take advantage of the federal funds available were required
to comply with pertinent federal requirements in order to qualify for and
assure continued receipt of such funds.29
The federal-state relationship created by the state's acceptance of this
reimbursement is at all times a delicate one since the state does not by its
mere participation surrender its traditional discretion to administer its
have been construed in a manner that would not have affected that basic
sovereign right of freedom from suits from one's own citizens. See generally
Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 Ga. L. Rev.
207 (1968); Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the
White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 Hous. L. Rev. 1 (1967).
21. 467 F.2d at 232.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 235.
25. See note 6 supra for a categorical explication.
26. Policies Governing the Administration of Public Assistance and Social
Services (pamphlet), New York City, N.Y. Dep't Soc. Services at 2, 63 (Nov.
1970) [hereinafter cited as Policies].
27. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970).
28. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
29. Id. at 317 n.12.
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public assistance programs as it sees fit.30 It is well settled that a state has
"considerable latitude" in allocating the federal funds available to it as
public assistance supplements."- It may protect its own economic interest
by exercising its undisputed right to set its own standards of need, thereby
determining who shall be eligible to receive welfare aid.3 2 It may also
limit its total expenditure in each individual assistance category by pre-
scribing differing but nondiscriminatory levels of benefits for the eligible
recipients in each subclassification.33 On the other hand, the federal
government, as grantor, has an understandable interest in seeing that the
funds it allocates to the states are expended in accord with the conditions
that Congress attached to their granting. 4 The right of the federal
government to impose conditions, other than those barred by constitu-
tional prohibition, outlining the manner in which its allotments to the
states shall be further dispersed has been firmly established.35 Therefore,
any state law or regulation inconsistent with such governing federal
regulations has been held invalid to the extent of that inconsistency."6
In endeavoring to map out the topography of the pertinent statutory
and regulatory provisions in what has been referred to as this "scheme of
cooperative federalism," 37 the federal courts have functioned somewhat
like a concerned relative called upon to arbitrate an increasing number
30. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
31. 392 U.S. at 318. The Supreme Court has held, however, that under
the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(23) (1970), a state may
not obscure the actual standard of need by defining it in a way that does not take
into account the rising cost of living, or by substantially altering its content unless
the state can demonstrate that items which it formerly included when computing
the standard of need are no longer required by its recipients. A state may, how-
ever, after recomputing its standard of need, lower its payments to accommodate
budgetary realities by reducing the percentage of benefits paid. Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397, 419 (1970).
32. 392 U.S. at 318. In May 1972, the Supreme Court again reaffirmed
its position that a state legislature's judgments in regard to the manner in which
its federal welfare funds are disbursed are not subject to a "constitutional strait-
jacket" so long as they are "rational, and not invidious." Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535, 546 (1972). See generally Note, 1 Fordham Urban L.J. 322 (1972).
33. Id. at 549-50.
34. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422-23 (1970). A state is, of course,
in no way prohibited from using only state funds according to whatever plan it
chooses providing no constitutional provisions are violated. Id. at 420.
35. 392 U.S. at 333 n.34.
36. Id.
37. 467 F.2d at 232.
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of disputes in a marriage that has been shaky from the start."8 Typically,
plaintiffs have been state citizens aggrieved at actions of their respective
state governments. 39 For reasons of utility or convenience, they have
sought federal forums for the resolution of their grievances and they have
strived to find adequate federal "levers" with which to multiply their
chances of litigational success. ° The federal courts, fully appreciative
of this, have had doubts on occasion about the prudence of becoming
involved in these controversies since principles of federalism continuously
impose restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdictional power to inter-
fere with the federal-state relationships in question.41
The Supreme Court, however, has declared in King v. Smith that, at
least in those cases where "the constitutional challenge is sufficiently
substantial, '4 2 federal courts do have jurisdiction to review state welfare
practices. In King, the plaintiffs were not obliged to exhaust the adminis-
trative remedies provided in the Social Security Act prior to bringing
their action.43 In deciding that Alabama's "man-in-the-house" regulation
was inconsistent with the Social Security Act,44 the Court, however,
specifically did not answer the question of whether (or under what
conditions) a suit challenging state welfare provisions merely on federal
statutory (non-constitutional) grounds could be brought in a federal
court.45
Underlying a lower federal court's concern of whether it may appro-
priately exercise its jurisdiction in this area has been a problem of
balance. The disadvantages of imposing sanctions upon a state for non-
compliance with federal standards must be weighed against the advan-
tages of redressing the wrong done to individuals adversely affected by
38. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), wherein the Court
stated: "[T]he intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems
presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this
Court.... [TI]he Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state
officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare
funds among the myriad of potential recipients." Id. at 487.
39. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
40. See, e.g., Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12 (D. Me. 1970).
41. See C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts 177-86 (2d ed.
1970).
42. 392 U.S. at 312 n.4 (1967).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 327.
45. Id. at 312 n.3. In King, the constitutional issue was at all times present
but the Court found it unnecessary to resolve that matter in rendering its decision
which was premised entirely upon the statutory conformance question. Id. at 313.
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the non-complying misallocation of federal funds. A court must neces-
sarily be chary of further aggravating the less than harmonious relation-
ship that may exist between the federal and state authorities in such cases.
Federal courts have experienced no difficulty in granting declaratory
relief and restraining further use of federal funds pursuant to an invalid
state plan." The choice is then left to the state to either assume the full
burden of providing for its poor or to revise its assistance programs in
accord with federal standards.4 7 These remedies, however, may be seen
as deficient in that they merely safeguard the public assistance recipient
from future injury-nonpayment of entitled benefits. The recipient has
not been compensated for monies which the state has finally, after
oftentimes lengthy judicial proceedings, been determined to have uncon-
stitutionally withheld. The question of the propriety of a federal court
entertaining a suit for such monies as were withheld during this "pro-
cedural interim" has now been answered-in the resounding negative-
by the Second Circuit."
Prior to Rothstein, the right to receive welfare aid was not deemed to
create a vested right to payments that had been unlawfully withheld.49
Since public assistance payments had as their purpose the "satisfaction of
the ascertained needs of impoverished persons,"50 the present existence
of such needs may be supposed to form a hypothetical precondition to
welfare expenditures. In effect, welfare aid is a means of insuring sur-
vival, and the fact that a recipient is alive to protest nonpayment of these
funds is "per se proof" of the fact that the social purpose of insuring
survival has in some way been met. Thus, there is no longer the continu-
ing requirement of guaranteeing that survival by the expenditure of public
funds.51 This principle, reflected in the operational policy of the local
46. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
47. See Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173, 1196 (1970). This seems
no more than a mere Hobson's choice, however, for few states have either
sufficient financial resources to assume the full burden or the willingness to risk
the political consequences of not doing so.
48. 467 F.2d at 235-36.
49. Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173, 1196 (1970).
50. 467 F.2d at 235. See 322 F. Supp. at 1184-87 for examples of such
"ascertain[able] needs."
51. A theoretical rebuttal might be offered by the provident welfare recipient
-welfare's "reasonable man"-who, possessed of a good credit rating, had the
foresight to borrow funds sufficient to maintain his habitual existence and who
could conclusively demonstrate both the fact of such borrowing and the fact that
his continued survival was made possible only by the funds generated via the
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welfare department,52 finds theoretical support in the fact that the state
has a legitimate interest in protecting the financial resources which it
makes available to its needy residents by providing that payments not
be made to recipients whose past "need" is incapable of a present actual-
ity and who perhaps are no longer even on its welfare rolls.m
The Rothstein court noted the effect of the passage of time upon the
nature of the payment the plaintiffs sought. Judge McGowan observed
that although "there may perhaps be cases in which the prompt payment
of funds wrongfully withheld will serve that end, 54 the time span of
loan which he is now obligated to repay. But, in Rothstein, such was not the case.
There was no lowering by the state of the plaintiffs' benefits. Rather, a benefit level
was postulated for the entire state. That level governed what plaintiffs received.
Then it was noted simply that it costs more to maintain a given standard of
living in New York City than in most of the rest of the state and an attempt was
made to take realistic cognizance of this fact by paying a "high cost of living"
differential to people in the areas affected. No reduction in plaintiffs' originally
intended benefit levels was made. When this differential system was found to be
discriminatory, the state was given two choices: (1) cut back the New York City
levels to that of the rest of the state or (2) raise the state level to that of New
York City. The result of either choice would have been to restore equality of pay-
ment levels to all recipients. Had option (1) been followed, plaintiffs would have
received all that they were legitimately entitled to receive and the New York City
welfare recipients would have been the fortuitous beneficiaries of an illegal
"windfall" which, at least in "moral" theory, they would have been obligated to
repay to the state. The fact that the state opted for the more humanitariaf
alternative-that of raising the plaintiffs' benefit levels-should not entitle plain-
tiffs to receive that which had never really been denied them. One can easily
imagine the societal and legal chaos that Would result from the adoption of the
theory tendered by plaintiffs-that every governmental grant of a benefit (which
a court finally determines to be illegal) to one individual or group automatically
establishes a right of all not so favored to a like grant. Indeed, the net result
of adopting the plaintiffs' logic would be to insure that the state would, in similar
circumstances, equalize benefits by reduction rather than enlargement so as to
obviate the question of any retroactive obligation on the state's part.
52. See Policies, supra note 26, at 71.
53. 467 F.2d at 234.
54.. Id. at 235. A cynic might foresee a hard-eyed, cold-hearted state
bureaucracy attempting to utilize the admittedly lethargic court process
to its own spurious advantage. A patently illegal reduction in benefits
might selectively be made. Though expecting to lose the resultant suit, the state
would nevertheless be able to point with pride to all the monies it had saved by
its "economy of non-retroactivity" during the time the issue took to be finally
resolved (three years and two months in Rothstein, for example). In reply, it
need only be pointed out that the Rothstein court freely conceded that compelling
retroactive payments may well be necessary where a state acts in bad faith (see
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sixteen months between the date of the last insufficient payment and the
district court order compelling retroactive payments was such as to
cause those payments to "become compensatory rather than remedial."55
The court noted two other congressional interests that might be
furthered by ordering retroactive payments-deterrence of future willful
"state violations of federal requirements"56 and protection of the federal
grantor's interest in the "proper use of granted funds. '57 The first of
these the court deemed inapplicable because it found no evidence of
bad faith on the part of the state such as to require that New York "be
dramatically confronted by the minatory face of federal courts."58 The
second legitimate federal legislative interest that might be served by
compulsive benefit retroactivity is viewed by the court as being "not
personal to welfare recipients."59 Indeed, since Congress expressly pro-
vided for a protection of its interests by a cutoff of federal funding, the
court saw no reason to supply the additional court-generated safeguard
of retroactivity.60
The court thus has ample reasons for its decision, but the court's
willingness to follow the dictates of common sense is most forcefully
evident in its rejection of the district court's order on the first of the
three grounds discussed above. The court recognized the social goal
of public assistance payments and readily conceded the vicissitudes
of life experienced by most recipients thereof, considering itself "not
insensitive to the special incremental value of money to persons living
at subsistence levels." 61 But the court looked also to the larger issue
and saw the concept of "present compelling need"62 as controlling.
The court appreciated that money to make the retroactive payments
cannot be generated spontaneously. It must come from the public coffers,
either federal or state, and the court, unsure that "persons from whom
note 58 infra and accompanying text). In any event, the Rothstein denial of
retroactivity did not involve a fact situation where one subclass had been illegally
disfavored in comparison with all others, but rather where one had been specifically
advantaged (see note 51 supra and accompanying text).
55. 467 F.2d at 235.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 234.
62. Id.
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funds were withheld in 1969 have a present compelling need for them,"68
believed it to be not "provident, given existing deprivations which
might be relieved, to order the expenditure of scarce funds as compensa-
tion for past suffering which, however deplorable, cannot be undone."64
In this manner the court decided affirmatively that a challenge in the
nature of Rothstein,5 Rosado,66 and Dandridge67 could be decided
solely on nonconstitutional grounds.68 Realistically examining the nu-
merous complexities, the court succeeded in weighing the interests of
the relevant parties-plaintiffs, present recipients of welfare, and the
authorities, state and federal. Conceding that a loss would have to be
borne by someone, the court found that justice required that the plain-
tiffs, their present existence affirming their past survival, should bear
such loss, in order that those of them still receiving assistance and others
similarly situated could be assured that the funds available would truly
meet "current needs."69
The court, however, was not content with merely upsetting the im-
proper exercise of the district court's equity jurisdiction. Though it
found the above reasons more than adequate to support its decision and
thus so stressed, the court also saw a legitimate constitutional issue as
to whether the district court had any jurisdiction to exercise at all. The
issue involves the eleventh amendment70 to the Federal Constitution
which precludes extension of the federal judicial power to suits against
a state.7' Although not evident by its actual wording, the amendment
63. Id.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972).
66. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
67. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
68. See notes 19 and 45 supra and accompanying text.
69. 467 F.2d at 235.
70. U.S. Const. amend. XI. See note 20 supra.
71. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, long established in English common
law, was adopted in America after independence despite the fact that the new
government was conceived as a democracy in which the people themselves were
the sovereigns. Since there was no king to whom immunity could pass, it was
attributed to the United States and to each of the individual states. Until the
adoption of the constitution which created a national judiciary, state courts were
the only courts in existence and it was a clearly accepted principle that states were
immune from suit in their own courts. See note 20 supra.
In defining the jurisdiction of the new federal courts, however, the framers of
the Constitution, perhaps inadvertently, left open the possibility that suits could
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has long been held to prevent a citizen of any state from employing the
federal judicial forum to sue his own parent state72 unless that state
waives its immunity to such suit.73 The court in Rothstein reiterated that
this waiver must be express and unequivocal and rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that New York had impliedly surrendered this constitutional
immunity by accepting federal assistance for its welfare programs.74 The
court noted that while the federal constitution does not preclude a fed-
eral court directing a state official to comply with a federal statute,7 a
"judgment declaring a liability which must be met from the public funds
of the state does come within the reach of the Eleventh Amendment;
and a court will, absent the state's consent, be deemed without jurisdic-
tion to enter such a judgment. '70 That "Congress has not explicitly
conditioned the grant of such funds upon the willingness of the recipient
state to waive the immunity from suit provided by the Eleventh Amend-
ment"77 when it readily could have done so, is conclusive to the court
of the fact that Congress did not so desire. The court further observed
that "retroactive payments [were not] so necessary to the effectuation of
congressional policies that a waiver [arose] by implication. 7 Though
be brought in federal court against a state by citizens of another state. U.S. Const.
art III, § 2 provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution . . . between a State and Citizens of
another State... ." Seeming almost to invite such suits, this clause threatened the rule
of sovereign immunity of the states. A sequence of cases followed ratification
in which individuals sought to take advantage of this loophole to recover claims
against the states. See, e.g., Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320 (1794);
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793). As a result of these cases,
which not only challenged the states' sovereignty but seriously endangered their
financial positions as well, the eleventh amendment was adopted. The amendment
provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI.
72. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See also Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 576-77 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1945).
73. 467 F.2d at 238-39.
74. Id. at 238.
75. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), considered this not to be truly a
suit involving the state itself as a defendant.
76. 467 F.2d at 236.
77. Id. at 238.
78. Id. The court also rejected the notion that an ambiguous statement made
by a New York State Department of Social Service attorney in the lower court
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the plaintiffs alleged Supreme Court-affirmed precedents7" as supporting
the retroactivity they sought, the circuit court found that the Supreme
Court had not "yet addressed itself specifically and authoritatively to
this issue. '"" Examining the leading case, Shapiro v. Thompson,81 the
court in Rothstein found that, although the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Connecticut "characterized the Eleventh Amendment as no bar-
rier to its award"' 2 of retroactive payments, the issue was not raised on
appeal and the Supreme Court made "no reference of any kind to that
matter in [its] lengthy affirming opinion."'s
Similarly, in Rodriguez v. Swank,84 the defendant state, Illinois, was
seen by the Rothstein court to have resisted a federal district court's
order for retroactive payments on the statutory grounds that federal
regulations implementing the Social Security Act made no provision for
retroactive payments.8 5 No mention was made of a constitutional ques-
tion. Again, in Boddie v. Wyman,"' defendant state officials on appeal
challenged a judgment in the plaintiffs' favor but failed to contest the
issue of the "corrective payments" they had been ordered to make.87
Finally, in Gaddis v. Wyman, neither the opinions of the district court88
nor the Supreme Court's summary affirmance89 made any mention of
the "remedy of retroactive payments to persons denied assistance prior
to the invalidation of the statute." 90
proceeding concerning the feasibility of repayment could suffice to act as the
requisite waiver. Id.
79.. See Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd, 403
U.S. 901 (1971); Boddie v. Wyman, 323 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd 434
F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd 402 U.S. 991 (1971); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304
F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub nom., Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49
(1970); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S.
618 (1969).
80. 467 F.2d at 239.
81. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
82. 467 F.2d at 239.
83. Id.
84. Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
85. 467 F.2d at 240.
86. 323 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 434 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1970),
aft'd, 402 U.S. 991 (1971).
87. See 434 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1970) wherein the defendant state, New
York, in its appeal, made no mention of the "corrective payments" feature of the
judgment, as the Rothstein court observed. 467 F.2d at 241.
88. 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
89. Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970).
90. 467 F.2d at 239.
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Thus the Rothstein court notes that "the Supreme Court has not yet
come to grips with the problem of retroactive public assistance pay-
ments as a remedy which federal courts either can or should order to be
made"'" and perceives a legal vacuum that the court should properly
abhor in view of the continuing quandaries that have resulted from the
lack of judicial or legislative resolution of this "complex and confused"
issue. 2 The court clearly deems the establishment of parameters to be
desirable and it feels free, in light of the Supreme Court's nonaction, to
set those parameters. Thus it finds that "the Eleventh Amendment stands
in the way."98
This desire on the part of the court to provide an answer to a previ-
ously unsettled (and possibly even purposefully avoided) question may
stem in part from a wish to bring the matter to the attention of the Su-
preme Court for final resolution. Such a motive would explain why the
decision is based upon both a pragmatic premise and a constitutional
one since the former alone would have been more than sufficient. Fur-
91. Id. at 241.
92. Id.
93. Id. Two subsequent cases have treated quite similar issues. In one of them,
the district court finds itself "persuaded by, and in full agreement with" Rothstein
and finds the eleventh amendment serving as a bar to its compelling retroactive
payments to be made by the state. Like v. Carter, 353 F. Supp. 405, 406 (E.D. Mo.
1973). In the other, the Seventh Circuit, citing Rothstein, found itself "unper-
suaded by its reasoning." Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 990 (7th Cir. 1973).
The Jordan court, however, focuses entirely upon the Second Circuit's evaluation
of the constitutional question involved and appears completely unwilling to temper
any such classical analysis with pragmatic considerations. It cites four summary
(or "equivalent" thereof) Supreme Court opinions to buttress its own view. It
addresses Rothstein, misreads or ignores the Second Circuit's discussion therein of
what a federal court was empowered to do (467 F.2d at 235) and gratuitously
pronounces that a "federal court's equitable intervention may take an effective
form." 472 F.2d at 991. The Jordan court failed to make the obvious distinction
in the different factual backgrounds of the two cases, which distinction would
have noted that the defendant state, Illinois, violated clear and explicit federal
regulations in the conduct of its AABD program, whereas New York in Rothstein
had made a determined effort to work within such regulations and was found to
have erred on complex constitutional bases only after a lengthy court determina-
tion. The Seventh Circuit might also have noted the significantly smaller amount
of retroactive payments sought in the case it was deciding. Thus, it need not be
seen as directly contradicting the essence of Rothstein. Stripped of its verbiage
Jordan merely sets forth one more specific state abuse that may require corrective
compulsive retroactivity-one of a class of abuses that the Rothstein court fully
anticipated would be further defined (467 F.2d at 235).
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thermore, a decision resting solely thereupon would have been fully in
accord with the general principle that constitutional questions will not
be answered (or raised and answered) by a court if such be not neces-
sary for final determination. 4 For such action the Rothstein court may
well be praised. The court observed a problem that had been posed in
a variety of tangential manners but which had as yet defied full resolu-
tion. It saw that this question would continue to trouble state authorities,
federal courts, and litigious plaintiffs. Thus the court acted, settling the
question posed and insuring that its solution will either be accepted or
will, if challenged either directly or indirectly, 5 lead to a final resolution
in the forum appropriate to such-the Supreme Court. Such resolution
may or may not be in agreement with the Rothstein court's own response
to the problem, but by its action the Second Circuit has certainly en-
couraged the making of that determination.
In sum, the Rothstein court finds two separate grounds for rejecting
plaintiffs' suit, each ground sufficient by itself to sustain the denial. It
rejects the claim that all monies improperly withheld must, upon a find-
ing of such impropriety, be reimbursed to those deprived, resisting the
hasty and visceral sense of outrage that simplistically makes such claims
seem "obviously right." The court painstakingly makes an unbiased anal-
ysis of the legitimate interests of the parties involved, and finds the
state's interests compelling and paramount. 6 Furthermore, taking up
the constitutional question to an extent greater than that to which it
was minimally required, the court fashioned its decision in a way most
likely to bring the vexatious eleventh amendment question to a conclu-
sive determination. For the duality of this decision-its present and its
potential effects-the Rothstein court may be most appropriately termed
courageous.
94. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
95. Such challenge could be posed either directly on appeal from the Second
Circuit's holding in Rothstein or indirectly by virtue of the Rothstein court having
established one polar position on the matter. Thus, should another circuit take an
opposite stance (as has recently been the case; see note 93 supra), the issue
becomes "ripe" for Supreme Court resolution.
96. See notes 51-53 and 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
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ZONING LAW-Growth Restrictions-Town Ordinance Conditioning
Approval of Residential Subdivision Plan on the Availability of Neces-
sary Municipal Services Held Valid. Golden v. Planning Board, 30
N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
In 1966, as a result of an extensive study of land use, demographic
projections and the availability of public facilities, the Town of Ramapo,
Rockland County, New York adopted a master development plan which
was subsequently followed by the adoption of a comprehensive zoning
ordinance.' A capital budget was drawn up providing for the construc-
tion of public facilities during the following six years. At the same time,
as a supplement to the capital budget, the town board adopted a program
calling for additional capital improvements to be made during a twelve
year period following the six years covered by the capital budget.2
In 1969, Ruth Golden and the Ramapo Improvement Corporation
which had contracted to purchase her fifty-three acres for development,
submitted a preliminary subdivision plat to the town's planning board
for approval to subdivide the property into forty-one lots.'
Six days after the preliminary proposal had been submitted to the
planning board, the town board amended the town's zoning ordinance
to require residential developers to obtain a special permit from the town
board before plat approval could be obtained from the planning board.4
1. Towns are required by law to zone in accordance with a comprehensive
plan. N.Y. Town Law § 263 (McKinney 1965).
2. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 366-67, 285 N.E.2d 291, 294-95,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 142-43 (1972).
3. N.Y. Town Law § 276 (McKinney Supp. 1972) provides: "For the pur-
pose of providing for the future growth and development of the town and afford-
ing adequate facilities for the housing, transportation, distribution, comfort,
convenience, safety, health and welfare of its population such town board may
by resolution authorize and empower the planning board to approve plats show-
ing lots, blocks or sites, with or without streets or highways, and to conditionally
approve preliminary plats, within that part of the town outside the limits of any
incorporated city or village."
4. Golden v. Planning Bd., 37 App. Div. 2d 236, 237, 324 N.Y.S.2d 178,
180 (2d Dep't 1971). "The amendments did not rezone or reclassify any land
into different residential or use districts, but . . .consist .. .of additions to the
definitional sections of the ordinance .. .and the adoption of a new class of
'Special Permit Uses,' designated 'Residential Development Use.' 'Residential De-
velopment Use' is defined as 'The erection or construction of dwellings or [sic]
any vacant plots, lots or parcels of land' . . . and, any person who acts so as to
come within that definition, 'shall be deemed to be engaged in residential develop-
ment which shall be a separate use classification under this ordinance and subject
[Vol. I
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Issuance of this permit was based on the town's determination of the
adequacy of specified facilities and services including sewers, drainage
facilities, parks, schools, roads and firehouses. 5 The town's master
development plan provided for the construction of sufficient facilities by
the end of the eighteen year combined capital budget and capital im-
provement program so that any sub-development plan which conformed
to the zoning ordinance could be approved. The amendment further
provided that no special permit would be issued unless the proposed
residential development would contain sufficient specified facilities as
set out in the zoning amendment.'
The amendment provided, in addition, that the developer could con-
struct the necessary facilities himself and thus avoid having to wait for
the town to construct them.7 Likewise, the developer could expedite
approval by providing the town with certain assurances of his com-
mitment to provide the necessary facilities." The town board was
authorized to modify the point requirements set out in the ordinance if
consistent with the overall development plan.' Finally, to lessen the
possible economic hardship which might result from a landowner being
forced to hold land for up to eighteen years before obtaining subdivision
approval, the developer could apply for a reduction of the assessed
value of his property pending construction of the required facilities. 10
The preliminary plat plan was disapproved by the planning board
because no special permit had first been obtained from the town board
as required by the recently amended ordinance. 1 The appellants sought
to the requirement of obtaining a special permit from the Town Board' .... "
(footnote omitted). 30 N.Y.2d at 367-68, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at
143.
5. 30 N.Y.2d at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d 143-44. The similarity
between these provisions and N.Y. Town Law § 263 (McKinney 1965) pertain-
ing to the purposes of zoning regulations should be noted: "Such [zoning] regu-
lations shall be . . .designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety
from fire, flood . . .to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements." N.Y. Town Law § 263
(McKinney 1965).
6. 30 N.Y.2d at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44. These in-
cluded adequate sewers, drainage facilities, parks and schools, roads and fire-
houses.
7. Id. at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 364, 285 N.E.2d at 293,334 N.Y.S.2d at 140-41.
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an order in Rockland County Supreme Court reviewing and annulling
the board's decision. They challenged the zoning ordinance on several
grounds: first, that Ramapo did not have the power to control its growth
through the means adopted in the amendment; second, the amendment
placed a burden on petitioners not shared by other similarly situated
landowners; and third, the amendment violated the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the law and freedom from deprivation
of property without due process.I2
The trial court held that the amended ordinance was valid and granted
summary judgment to the defendants.'" On appeal, the appellate division
reversed and granted appellants' motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional.' 4 In addition, the
appellate division held that the amendment exceeded the powers dele-
gated to the town by the state and violated the constitutional'require-
ment of equal protection.'5 Moreover, the court went beyond the
pleadings of the parties and also held that any provision in a zoning
ordinance which establishes time controls on land use is suspect as an
attempt to seal off a community from newcomers and avoid the burdens
of growth.'" The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate
division and held that the town's amendment to the zoning ordinance
was valid.'7
The New York legislature has provided towns with two methods of
directing and regulating development. The first is by means of district
zoning and the other is by requiring the submission and approval of
plats to a town planning board before permits allowing subdivision de-
velopment will be approved.' 8
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,19 the landmark Supreme
Court case on the constitutionality of zoning ordinances, the Court held
that the validity of zoning ordinances "must find their justification in
12. Id. at 363-64 (Points of Counsel appear only in the official reporter).
13. Golden v. Planning Bd., No. 525 (Sup. Ct., filed Nov. 13, 1970).
14. Golden v. Planning Bd., 37 App. Div. 2d 236, 244, 324 N.Y.S.2d 178,
186 (2d Dep't 1971).
15. Id. at 242-43, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 185-86.
16. Id. at 242-43, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
17. 30N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
18. N.Y. Town Law, §§ 261-64, 265-a to 75, 279-81 (McKinney 1965),
§§ 264-65, 267(5), 276-78, 281 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
19. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
518 [Vol. I
some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare."2 The
state, the Court concluded, has a rational basis for regulating the size,
type and height of buildings, so far as they directly affect the health and
safety of the population. Thus, zoning ordinances were to be judged
on the same basis as other exercises of state power which did not involve
interference with specially protected rights-i.e., an ordinance would
be held unconstitutional only if it were arbitrary and unreasonable. The
Court did not define what "arbitrary" or "unreasonable" meant in rela-
tion to zoning, but held that each case would have to be decided on its
own merits. 21
As a result of the Euclid decision upholding the broad power of the
states to regulate development, "Euclidian" type zoning grew rapidly.
22
However, rather than becoming directly involved, most states decided
that zoning could best be left to local government.28 Such a course has
been followed in New York State where the power to zone has been
delegated to the cities, towns, and villages.24 With respect to towns, the
legislature has provided two.methods of directing and regulating develop-
ment :21 (1) district zoning,26 and (2) requiring the submission and
approval of plats to a town planning board before permits allowing sub-
division development will be approved.27
Although Euclid held that zoning was a legitimate exercise of the
police power of the state, the New York courts have held that local
governments have no inherent power to zone under the general police
powers (to promote and protect the public health, safety, and welfare),
and therefore whatever power the locality has to regulate zoning is
derived solely from the state's delegation of such power.28 Because of
20. Id. at 387.
21. Id. at 395, 397.
22. See 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 2.10 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as 1 Anderson].
23. Id. § 3.01.
24. N.Y. Gen. City Law § 20(24), (25) (McKinney 1968); N.Y. Town Law
§ 261 (McKinney 1965); N.Y. Village Law § 7-700 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
25. N.Y. Town Law, art. 16 §§ 261 et seq. (McKinney 1965), as amended
(McKinney Supp. 1972) (Zoning and Planning).
26. Id. §§ 261-70. Section 262 provides for the division of the town into
zoning districts each with differing zoning provisions.
27. Id. § 271 et seq.
28. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d at 369-70, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 145; De Sena v. Gulde, 24 App. Div. 2d 165, 170, 265 N.Y.S.2d
239, 245 (2d Dep't 1965); Barker v. Switzer, 209 App. Div. 151, 153, 205
N.Y.S. 108, 109-10 (2d Dep't 1924).
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the extensive and explicit holding in Euclid, subsequent litigation deal-
ing with questions of zoning has not usually dealt with the inherent
power of the state to zone, but rather with challenges of the reasonable-
ness of specific ordinances or questions as to the constitutionality of an
ordinance as applied to particular situations.29
As with other exercises of state police powers which do not infringe
on specially protected rights, the courts, almost without exception, have
held that zoning ordinances are presumptively valid 80 and that the
burden "of establishing ... arbitrariness is imposed upon him who
asserts it."'
In recent years, the population in many suburban areas has increased
rapidly as a result of the outward migration of people from the cities
to the outlying areas." This great increase has found many local govern-
ments unprepared, unequipped, and in some cases unwilling to handle
such a major influx of new residents. 38 One technique which many com-
munities have adopted in an attempt to stem or stop the increase in
their populations has been exclusionary zoning." Increasingly, ex-
clusionary zoning is coming under attack as more and more people
attempt to leave the cities and find housing in the outlying areas.35
As early as 1917, the Supreme Court held that it was not a proper
function of zoning ordinances to exclude a particular race or ethnic
29. 1 Anderson, supra note 22, at § 2.10. Vernon Park Realty Inc. v. City of
Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
30. See, e.g., Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367-73, 200 A.2d 408-12
(1964); Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949).
31. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 121, 96 N.E.2d 731,
733 (1951).
32. For example, the court states that the population of the Town of Ramapo
increased by 130.8 per cent between 1950-1960; 78.5 per cent between 1960-
1966 and 20.4 per cent between 1966-1969, with most of the growth resulting
from subdivision development. 30 N.Y.2d at 366 n.1, 285 N.E.2d at 294 n.1,
334 N.Y.S.2d at 142 n.1.
33. 37 App. Div. 2d at 240, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 183. See 84 Harv. L. Rev.
1645 (1971).
34. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1971, at 1, col. 2, 35 cols. 3 & 4: "The suburbs have
... sought to protect their development from unwanted change by controlling their
most valuable resource: land .... Repeatedly, town boards engage in what is
called, variously, upzoning, exclusionary zoning, or large-lot zoning. Whatever the
name, the purpose is identical: If the only housing permitted is single family
homes, and if these must be sited on half, full, or even four-acre lots at a minimum,
only the middle-income and upper-income can afford to move in."
35. See notes 32-34 infra and accompanying text.
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group from a community;36 therefore, few zoning ordinances have been
worded so as to expressly bar specific groups.87 However, exclusionary
zoning can be and has undoubtedly been used as a means of achieving
the same ends where an ordinance appears on its face to be a legitimate
exercise of the locality's power to zone for the protection of the health,
safety and welfare of the population. For example, a town with a limited
water supply may have a legitimate need to slow down an increase in
population. However, an identical ordinance could be passed for the
purpose of restricting entry to only the well-to-do. The courts are then
forced to look behind the wording of the ordinance to determine what,
in fact, it was intended to accomplish. 8
Courts have, in recent years, become increasingly skeptical of the
validity of any zoning ordinance which has the effect of freezing popula-
tion levels in a community. 9 They have also had to consider what re-
strictions may be imposed through zoning of property before it amounts
to a condemnation. ° Generally, the courts hold that there has not been
a condemnation so long as there is any reasonable use to which the land
can be put. Significantly, in Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher,41
the court stated that a zoning ordinance which prohibited all reasonable
use of land might still be valid if the restraint were only to last for a
reasonable period of time.42
In addition to the power to zone, the New York legislature has pro-
36. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
37. 1 Anderson, supra note 22, at § 7.30.
38. 30 N.Y.2d at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149. "[Tlhough
the issues tin this case] are framed in terms of the developer's due process rights,
those rights cannot, realistically speaking, be viewed separately and apart from
the right of others 'in search of a [more] comfortable place to live.'" Id. (citations
omitted).
39. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 508, 215
A.2d 597, 610 (1965) (four acres per building lot held invalid); Concord Town-
ship Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 473-74, 268 A.2d 765, 773-74, (1970) (two and three
acre minimum lots held invalid); Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 242, 263 A.2d 395,
397 (1970) (no district within which apartment buildings could be constructed
held invalid).
40. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (restriction
completely destroying value of property requires compensation); Arverne Bay
Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938) (permanent re-
striction on the use of property so that it cannot be used for any reasonable pur-
pose is a taking of property).
41. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
42. Id. at 232, 15 N.E.2d at 592.
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vided localities with another means of controlling and regulating de-
velopment. By statute,4 each town board is authorized to appoint a
planning board which has the power to grant or deny approval of sub-
division plats submitted by a developer. 44 In addition, the planning board
can condition its approval on the provision of certain specified facilities
by the developer, 4 and the court of appeals has upheld the validity of
such a statute.46
In Golden, the court was confronted with a case which involved all
of the problems and considerations discussed above. In addition, no case
had previously been litigated involving a zoning ordinance exactly like
the one passed by the Ramapo town board. The majority appears well
aware of the far-reaching impact which this decision will have and ex-
ercises understandable judicial restraint in attempting to avoid tying the
court's hands in future cases. Thus, it is particularly important to
distinguish between what the court actually held and the broader issues
involved.
The opinion begins with a discussion of the facts and the background
of the case .47 And yet, in this preliminary descriptive material, the court
raised an important issue. That is, what was the town's intent in passing
the zoning amendment? 48 While the opinion states that the question need
not be investigated because the issue was not raised by the parties (and
thus the amendment is presumed to have been passed for legitimate
purposes)49 the court implies that it might invalidate an ordinance passed
43. N.Y. Town Law § 271 (McKinney 1965).
44. Id. § 276 (McKinney Supp. 1972). See note 3 supra.
45. Id. § 277 provides in part: "Before the approval by the planning board
of a plat ... such plat shall ... show in proper cases and when required by the
planning board, a park . . . . In approving such plats the planning board shall
require that the streets ... be of sufficient width . . . and shall be suitably located
to accommodate the prospective traffic, to afford adequate light and air, to fa-
cilitate fire protection . . . where a zoning ordinance has been adopted by the
town the plots shown on said plat shall at least comply with the requirements
thereof ... that ... water mains, fire alarm signal devices . . . sanitary sewers
• . . shall be installed . . . or alternatively that a performance bond sufficient to
cover the full cost of the same as estimated by the planning board or other ap-
propriate town departments designated by the planning board shall be furnished
to the town by the owner."
46. Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164,169,106 N.E.2d 503, 506 (1952).
47. 30 N.Y.2d at 366, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
48. Id. at 366 n.1,285 N.E.2d at 294 n.1,334 N.Y.S.2d at 142 n.1.
49. Id.
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with the intent of blocking entry into the community.50 However, the
Golden court cites numerous statistics documenting Ramapo's rapid
growth5 and concludes that for lack of contrary evidence the ordinance
is not invalid on its face. Thus, the court appears to reject the appellate
division's assumption 2 that the amendment was passed with an exclusion-
ary intent.
Subsequently, the court describes the varying lot size and density re-
quirements in. the residentially zoned areas of the town (another issue
not raised in the pleadings) and states:
The reasonableness of these minimum lot requirements are not presently contro-
verted, though we are referred to no compelling need in their behalf.53
The court suggests that if faced with a challenge to Ramapo's minimum
lot size requirements, it might well hold them invalid unless the town
could sustain the burden of proving their necessity.5 4
The court next discusses whether the town had the power and authority
to amend its zoning ordinance to require a developer to obtain a special
permit before building could be commenced. The appellate division held
that "the power to place time controls on a municipality's population
expansion, as in the instant case, has not yet been delegated." '55 The
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 37 App. Div. 2d at 242-43, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 185. "'The question posed
is whether the township can stand in the way of the natural forces which send
our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfort-
able place to live. We have concluded not. A zoning ordinance whose primary
purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens,
economic and otherwise, upon the administration of public services and facilities
cannot be held valid.' In any event, the whole concept of phasing residential de-
velopment through time controls on land use is pregnant with the notion of ac-
ceptable discrimination." Id. (citation omitted).
53. 30 N.Y.2d at 367 n.2, 285 N.E.2d at 295 n.2, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143 n.2
(citations omitted).
54. Id. Here again, the court appears to imply that if it were shown that
Ramapo was intentionally excluding nonwhites, or even if it were shown that the
town was not making some effort toward integrating the community, the town's
zoning ordinance would not be permitted to stand. However, the town's com-
mitment to bi-racial housing may not be as strong as the court suggests. See
Farrelly v. Town of Ramapo, 35 App. Div. 2d 957, 317 N.Y.S.2d 837 (2d Dep't
1970). This memorandum decision states that the "bi-racial low-income" housing
referred to above by the court of appeals was to consist of 120 units: 90 units
for the elderly and only 30 units for the non-elderly!
55. 37 App. Div. 2d at 244, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
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court of appeals admits that the zoning enabling section of the Town
Law does not specifically authorize the timing controls (i.e., approving
subdivision plats only as essential services become available) adopted
by the town.56 However, the court suggests that an argument could be
made !(which had been raised but was rejected by the appellate
division)57 that the powers given to the town by section 261 of the Town
Law58 do include the authority to predicate approval of development
plans on the construction of certain services and facilities. In a footnote
the court states:
[Tihere would appear to be a direct correlation between population density, the
demand for municipal services in the form of school, water, sanitary, police and
fire protection facilities. . . . To the extent that the subject regulations seek to
insure provision of adequate facilities, they too may be identified as forms of
density controls.59
However, the court does not draw from this a corollary that regulation
of necessary services is a legitimate method of restricting the density of
population.
Rather than rely on the above line of argument, the court follows
another route and holds that in determining the extent of the delegated
power, all sections of Article 16 of the Town Law (Zoning and Plan-
ning) must be considered together. The court once again recognizes that
all zoning power must be founded upon a legislative delegation ° but it
points out that the powers listed in section 261 are not the only zoning
powers upon which the towns can draw."' This is shown, the court holds,
by the fact that the powers stated in section 261 are not coterminous
with the stated police power objectives listed in section 263.2 Although
56. 30 N.Y.2d at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
57. 37 App. Div. 2d at 242, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
58. N.Y. Town Law § 261 (McKinney 1965) provides in part: "For the
purposes of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the
community, the town board is hereby empowered by ordinance to regulate and
restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures,
the percentage of lot[s] that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other
open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings,
structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes .... .
59. 30 N.Y.2d at 370 n.3, 285 N.E.2d at 296 n.3, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 145 n.3
(citations omitted).
60. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
61. See note 58 supra.
62. 30 N.Y.2d at 370, 285 N.E.2d at 296-97, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
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the section 261 powers have traditionally been considered less exten-
sive,3 the powers enumerated in that section are listed only to give
constitutional validity to the state's delegation of the zoning power to
the towns."4 In fact, suggests the court, towns have the implied power to
carry out all of the purposes (listed in section 263) for which zoning can
be passed."5 Therefore, the amendment in question is valid as far as the
issue of delegated power is concerned because it is directed at a legitimate
zoning purpose listed in section 263.6
The court intimates that this interpretation leads one far astray from
the traditional concept of zoning:
Of course, zoning historically has assumed the development of individual plats
and has proven characteristically ineffective in treating with the problems attend-
ing subdivision and development of larger parcels, involving as it invariably does,
the provision of adequate public services and facilities. To this end, subdivision
control (Town Law' §§ 276, 277) purports to guide community development in
the directions outlined here, while at the same time encouraging the provision of
adequate facilities for the housing, distribution, comfort and convenience of local
residents .... And though it may not, in a definitional or conceptual sense be
identified with the power to zone, it is designed to complement other land use
restrictions, which, taken together, seek to implement a broader, comprehensive
plan for community development. 67
The court declines to draw any specific conclusion. The most superficial
interpretation of what the court is intimating might be merely that since
zoning and plat approval are two tools available to a town for use in the
control and regulation of growth and development, they do not consti-
tute two distinct functions. However, it is possible that the dissenting
opinion is correct and that the majority had something more abstruse in
mind. 68 What the court appears to hold is that since the broad purposes
of zoning and subdivision control are the same (i.e., control and regula-
tion of land use) the town board has the implied power to carry out the
legitimate purposes of zoning and, in addition, the purposes of plat ap-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. I.e., "to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sew-
erage, schools, parks and other public requirements." N.Y. Town Law § 263
(McKinney 1965).
67. 30 N.Y.2d at 372, 285 N.E.2d at 298, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 147 (citations
omitted).
68. Id. at 386, 285 N.E.2d at 306, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 158-59.
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proval listed in section 276.19 It is important to note how far afield this
interpretation is from the express language of the statutes.70
In sections 261 and 263, the legislature expressly empowers the town
board to pass zoning ordinances for specified purposes. Section 262 de-
fines the form that zoning is to take. The board is empowered to divide
the town into districts and designate the uses to which each district can
be put. On the other hand, section 271 provides for the creation of a
planning board by the town board. This planning board can, inter alia,
prepare a master plan for the town,71 and approve or disapprove plats
submitted to it by developers who wish to subdivide 2 and can make
approval conditioned on the subdivider providing certain specified
facilities.7" The statute requires that plats conform to the zoning ordi-
nance before they can be approved by the planning board. 74 For example,
if the area in question were zoned "one acre-resideitial," the planning
board could not approve a plat which provided for half-acre subdivision.
Ramapo appears to be relying on this provision of section 277 to
support the lawfulness of its amended zoning ordinance which requires
a subdivider to obtain a special permit confirming that its plat conforms
to the zoning ordinance before the planning board can approve the plat.
However, the criteria upon which the amended ordinance authorizes the
town board to find that a plat does not so conform do not appear to
have been provided either expressly or by implication in the Town Law.75
Under Ramapo's ordinance, the town board has veto power over con-
siderations which the statute specifically states are to be decided by the
planning board. The planning board has no opportunity to review any
plat submitted until the town board has first given its approval. Plat
approval is thus almost entirely in the hands of the town board-an
69. Id. at 370, 285 N.E.2d at 296-97, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 145-46.
70. See N.Y. Town Law §§ 261, 263 (McKinney 1965). See also notes 5 &
59 supra.
71. N.Y. Town Law § 272-a (McKinney 1965) provides in part: "The
planning board may prepare and change, a comprehensive master plan for the
development of the entire area of the town, which master plan shall show desirable
streets, bridges and tunnels and the approaches thereto, viaducts, parks ... zoning
districts . . . and such other features existing and proposed as will provide for the
improvement of the town and its future growth, protection, and development, and
will afford adequate facilities for the public housing, transportation, distribution,
comfort, convenience, public health, safety and general welfare of its population."
72. Id. § 276 (McKinney Supp. 1972). See note 3 supra.
73. Id. § 277. See note 45 supra.
74. Id.
75. Id. §§ 261, 263 (McKinney 1965). See notes 5 & 58 supra.
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arrangement which certainly appears to do violence to the express lan-
guage of article 16.
In approving the challenged amendment, the court never squarely
confronts the significant issue of the power of the town board to assume
a function specifically delegated to another body. Rather, the court relies
on an integration of sections 261 and 263 which deal exclusively with
the powers and purposes of zoning and do not concern the planning
board at all.
The court next turns to petitioners' contention that the timing controls
are invalid because they in effect prohibit the subdivision development
pending some action by the town over which petitioners have no control.
The court agrees that although the "Planning Board is not in an ab-
solute sense statutorily authorized to deny the right to subdivide,"7 but
points out that the true issue at bar is, rather, "whether development may
be conditioned pending the provision by the municipality of specified
services and facilities."77
There are at least two arguments to refute petitioners' contention, and
the court discusses both. First, the town's restrictions on development are
closely tied with its eighteen year capital program. If the plan progresses
as scheduled, by the end of the eighteenth year sufficient facilities will
have been completed so that any plat submitted which conformed to the
zoning ordinance would be approved. 8 Although there is no guarantee
that the town will adhere to its development plan, in the absence of
contradictory evidence "we must assume not only the Town's good faith,
but its assiduous adherence to the program's scheduled implementa-
tion."70 The court adds that should the town fail to provide the services
and facilities specified in the plan, the petitioners would then have the
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance as it
applies to the property in question. 0
76. 30 N.Y.2d at 373,-285 N.E.2d at 298, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 147 (emphasis
added).
77. Id. at 374, 285 N.E.2d at 299, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 148. The court possibly
obfuscated the issue at bar. While the court is referring to the power of the
planning board, the amendment in question deals with the power of the town
board which had the effect of abrogating the power of the planning board to rule
on plat proposals. If the court was treating these two bodies synonymously, it
certainly does extreme violence to the explicit language in the statute. See note 43
supra.
78. 30 N.Y.2d at 373 n.7, 285 N.E.2d at 298-99 n.7, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 148
n.7.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Secondly, Ramapo's ordinance provides that should the developer not
wish to wait for the town to construct the required facilities, he can
expedite plat approval by building them himself at his own expense-a
procedure upheld in Brous and specifically authorized in section 277.1
Thus, the court rejects the argument that the amendment amounted to a
blanket prohibition against subdivision. s2
The court next addresses itself to the problem of zoning generally and
implicitly rebuts an argument set forth in the dissent.83 Both the majority
and minority of the court agree that zoning policy is far from perfect.
With the great shift in population from the cities to the suburbs, the
court, along with many planners, agrees that land use planning would
be better handled on at least a regional level. The majority points out,
however, that while zoning might better be handled on a regional basis,
today only local governments have the power to zone. 4 While local
solutions are far from ideal, they are the only ones currently available
and authorized by the legislature.85 The court is well aware that zoning
can easily lead to the exclusion of outsiders:8 6
There is, then, something inherently suspect in a scheme which, apart from its
professed purposes, effects a restriction upon the free mobility of a people until
sometime in the future when projected facilities are available to meet increased
demands.87
The court concludes it is equally unrealistic to close one's eyes to the
problems that arise from uncontrolled growth, and that Ramapo's solu-
tion, although limited, is "a first practical step toward controlled growth
achieved without forsaking broader social purposes."88
The court points out that the ultimate test, to determine which restric-
tions are permissible is not whether other methods of planning would be
preferable, but rather through an analysis of both the purposes of the
restriction and its impact,89 and this can be done only on a case-by-case
81. N.Y. Town Law § 277 (McKinney Supp. 1972). See note 45 supra.
82. 30 N.Y.2d at 373 n.7, 285 N.E.2d at 298 n.7, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 148 n.7.
83. Id. at 385,,285 N.E.2d at 306, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 158 stated, "Generally,
there is the view that the conflict [between the movement of people to the suburbs
and the desire of municipalities to control it] requires solution at a regional or
State level, usually with local administration, and not by compounding the conflict
with idiosyncratic municipal action" (citations omitted).
84. 30 N.Y.2d at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
85. Id. at 374-75, 285 N.E.2d at 299-300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 148-49.
86. Id. at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149-50.
87. Id. at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
88. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
89. Id. at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
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basis. The question is not whether the regulation will affect the type of
growth which would occur absent the regulation (which it inevitably
will) but rather whether the regulation is reasonable and arguably neces-
sary.90
"What we will not countenance, then, under any guise, is community
efforts at immunization or exclusion."'" The court concludes that neither
the purpose nor the impact of Ramapo's zoning ordinance is exclusion-
ary.9
2
Lastly, the court turns to petitioners' contention that the ordinance
amounts to confiscation without compensation in violation of both the
federal and state constitutions. The town points out that the challenged
amendment does not prevent petitioner from building a house on the
land. The response is that the land with only one house is worth only a
small fraction of its worth with forty-one houses, and thus the restriction
does amount, in effect, to a confiscation of the property. While admitting
that the restriction may be substantial, the court follows prior holdings
that a restriction which is not absolute does not amount to a confiscation
of property.93 The court also suggests that the addition of municipally
supplied services and facilities might, in the long run, actually increase
the petitioners' property value, and points out that in the interim the
ordinance provides for a reduction in the assessed value of the property
so affected, thus reducing the tax burden. In so holding, the court is not
creating new law but rather is extending principles decided in numerous
prior decisions. 94
The dissent discusses two primary objections to the amended zoning
ordinance. First, it subscribes to the appellate division's holding that
towns have not been delegated the power necessary to validate Ramapo's
ordinance. 95 In support of this argument, a number of decisions in other
jurisdictions are cited. However, those decisions deal with the problem
of the illegitimate and unreasonable exercise of zoning power-not with
the extent to which such power may be validly delegated to localities.
Secondly, the dissent suggests that zoning should properly be carried
on at the regional level and implies that the Ramapo ordinance is de-
90. Id. at 377-78, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151-52.
91. Id. at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156. "The proposed
restraints, mitigated by the prospect of appreciated value and interim reductions
in assessed value, and measured in terms of the nature and magnitude of the
project undertaken, are within the limits of necessity." Id.
94. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
95. 30 N.Y.2d at 384-85, 285 N.E.2d at 306, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 157-58.
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signed to insulate the town from the pressures of an expanding popula-
tion.9 However, this seems to beg the question. Both the majority and
the minority in Golden agree that zoning could not be used as a way
of avoiding increases in the town's population. The real question pre-
sented, and the one to which the minority never addresses itself is: what
were the purposes and effect of the zoning amendment passed by
Ramapo?
The court of appeals never discusses the constitutional requirement of
equal protection, an issue raised by the lower court.97 This issue may pro-
vide future litigants with the greatest opportunity for obtaining a court
decision holding a Ramapo-type zoning ordinance invalid.
Under section 261,8 the town board is empowered to pass zoning
ordinances to regulate and restrict the height of buildings, the minimum
size of land, parcels, and the uses to which such building can be put.
Section 263 sets out the purposes for which such restrictions can be
enacted.99 Section 262 provides that rather than zone the entire town
homogeneously, the town board may divide the town into districts, each
having different zoning provisions. 10 However, section 262 specifically
provides: "All such regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind
of buildings, throughout such district . .. ."'0'
In Golden, the district in question was zoned for rural residential use
with a minimum lot size of 50,000 square feet. As noted above, the
court held that the amendment did not change the permissible uses to
which the land could be put, but added a provision that the use of any
land for purposes of the construction of dwellings was prohibited in
the absence of a special permit from the town board. 02 Petitioners' plan
was to subdivide the fifty-three acres in question into forty-one plots.
Assuming that all plots were of equal size, each would be approximately
56,300 square feet-substantially larger than the minimum 50,000
square feet required by the zoning ordinance. It would appear, there-
fore, that petitioners are being denied equal protection of the law since
anyone holding 50,000 square feet or more of land could build a single
96. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
97. 37 App. Div. 2d at 243, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
98. N.Y. Town Law § 261 (McKinney 1965). See note 58 supra.
99. N.Y. Town Law § 263 (McKinney 1965). See note 5 supra.
100. N.Y. Town Law § 262 (McKinney 1965).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 276 (McKinney Supp. 1972). See notes 4 & 5 supra and accompany-
ing text.
530 [Vol. I
CASE NOTES
residence on his land, while petitioners are being denied approval to
build residences on even larger tracts of land. Thus, at least the applica-
tion of the zoning amendment appears to violate the section 262 re-
quirement that all zoning regulations be uniform throughout a zoning
district.103
On the other hand, it might be argued that the town avoided this
problem by providing that residential development is a separate use.
If this is the case, then the town has made the "act" of subdivision a
"use" in the same way that "residential" and "commercial" are uses.
This raises the question as to whether the term "use" as applied in zoning
ordinances under the delegated powers given to the town can legitimately
be applied to a transitory method or means of construction in addition
to its more traditional meaning. The court of appeals never resolves
this problem because it merely states that "The amendments did not
rezone or reclassify any land into different residential or use dis-
tricts .... "-0 While this is true, the court fails to mention that the amend-
ment did create a new land use-residential development. 0 5 Neither
section 261 nor section 263 refers, even by implication, to the methods
employed in the process of construction of a building but only provides
for regulation of the type of finished structure which can be constructed
and the uses to which that finished structure can be put. In Golden,
there is no question that the homes which are being proposed for con-
struction would conform to the type of structure and lot size re-
quirements of the zoning ordinance. What blocks construction of the
conforming houses is a zoning ordinance which regulates under what
conditions conforming houses can be built. It is certainly arguable that
the town board's actions were not within the scope of the powers dele-
gated by the legislature to the town board. The court's failure to confront
this issue may be explained at least partially by its frequent obfuscation
of the statutory differences between the town board and the planning
board. 106
In conclusion, the court of appeals has significantly expanded the
methods which a town may legitimately utilize to control the rate and
direction of growth. It has held that a town board can approve sub-
division plats conditioned on the availability of necessary public facili-
103. See note 100 supra.
104. 30 N.Y.2d at 367, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
106. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
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ties so long as the town can demonstrate that it is making a good faith
effort to supply these facilities and has a viable plan for their construc-
tion within a reasonable time. However, this power is limited in several
respects. The restrictions cannot be intended nor have the effect of
insulating a community from expansion and growth. In addition, the
methods utilized must not have the effect of foreclosing all reasonable
use of land for an indefinite period of time. And lastly, the court reaffirms
the right of towns to take reasonable steps to control growth and to
protect themselves from excessively rapid development which would
place an unacceptable burden on public facilities. Unless invalid on their
face, restrictions on development are presumed reasonable.
In order to find that the towns are empowered to impose such restric-
tion under the Zoning and Planning article of the Town Law, the court
is forced into several tortuous interpretations of the statutory delegation
of power, and it is in this area that legitimate questions are left unan-
swered by the court's decision.
